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This dissertation proposes a unified conceptualization of a set of seemingly 
distinct judgmental anchoring effects (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), including 
numeric effects (Wilson, Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996), semantic effects (e.g., 
Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) as well as implausible anchoring effects (e.g., 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a). These effects are viewed as special cases of a general, 
anchor-based, semantic priming mechanism. Specifically, during comparisons 
between the judgmental target and the anchor, judges are hypothesized to be primed 
with general semantic notions directly related to the anchor value. These anchor-
based semantics, in turn, are hypothesized to mediate anchoring effects. Study 1 
supported the hypothesis that anchor-based semantics may be responsible for 
producing anchoring effects by showing that considerations of implausible (vs. 
plausible) anchors are associated with higher levels of lexical activation of anchor-
related words (measured in a lexical decision task). This finding maps on to a larger 
anchoring effect obtained in the implausible vs. plausible anchoring condition. In 
study 2, participants were primed directly with anchor related words, resulting in a 
  
‘mimicked’ anchoring effect. Study 3 showed that associatively activated concepts, 
primed via a conditional rule, produce anchoring effects when the target and 
dimension of the judgment change between the comparative and absolute questions. 
Study 4 failed to support the prediction that a target change between a comparative 
task and related absolute numerical estimate, involving the same content domain, 
inhibits anchoring. Study 5 varied the typical anchoring paradigm by holding the 
numerical anchor constant and varying the target of the comparative question, 
producing a purely semantic anchoring effect. Finally, study 6 replicated and 
extended the findings obtained in study 5, providing additional evidence (from a 
lexical decision task) that anchor-based semantic notions produce anchoring effects. 
General discussion focuses on distinctions between the present theory and the 
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When making judgments under conditions of uncertainty, including (but not 
limited to) estimations of risk, value, personal ability, and general knowledge, 
persons have been shown to be robustly influenced by comparison standards, or 
anchors. While the term anchoring is a general term that appears in a variety of 
classic research domains (e.g., attitude-change, see Sherif & Hovland, 1961), social 
psychologists most likely associate it with the work of Tversky and Kahneman 
(1974), who presented insufficient adjustment and anchoring as one of three 
judgmental heuristics in their seminal Science article. In one of the most well known 
of their studies participants were first presented with a comparative question, which 
asked them to indicate whether the percentage of African Nations in the United 
Nations was higher or lower than 65 percent or 10 percent, depending on condition. 
Afterwards, participants were asked to provide an absolute estimate of the percentage 
of African Nations in the UN. Despite the fact that the anchors were generated 
randomly (by ways of spinning a wheel of fortune) results revealed that median 
estimates of the absolute percentage, 45% and 25% respectively, clearly depended on 
those values. 
Within the field of social judgment, the anchoring and adjustment heuristic 
has been demonstrated in diverse areas such as self-judgments (e.g., Cervone & 
Peake, 1986), negotiations (Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001), judicial decision-making 




1989), to name just a few. Furthermore, insufficient adjustment and anchoring has 
been used, at least analogously, to shed light on a variety of classical social 
psychological phenomena, including the hindsight bias (Pohl & Hell, 1996) and the 
correspondence bias (Quattrone, 1982).  
Initially, the main explanation for the effect came from Tversky and 
Kahneman (1974) themselves, who argued that judges consider the anchor value as 
an initial starting point for an insufficient adjustment process. That is, judges may 
engage in a directional adjustment process away from the anchor value and arrive 
(somehow) at an insufficiently adjusted absolute estimate. Jacowitz and Kahneman 
(1995) later elaborated on this notion and argued that the anchoring effect occurs 
because the directional adjustment process terminates at the nearest upper or lower 
boundary of a range of values a judge finds acceptable, which, from a normative 
standpoint, insufficiently corrects for the influence of the anchor value. 
In addition to ‘insufficient adjustment’, a number of theories explaining the 
anchoring phenomenon have recently been introduced to the social psychological 
literature. One of the most popular of these is the selective accessibility model (SA 
model hereafter) of Strack and Mussweiler (1997; Mussweiler & Strack, 1999a; 
1999b; 2000a; 2000b; 2001a; 2001b; Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000; Englich & 
Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, 2001; 2002; 2003). Another is Wilson, Houston, 
Etling, and Brekke’s (1996) basic anchoring model (see also Wong & Kwong, 2000; 
Brewer & Chapman, 2002). These models paint very different pictures of the 
anchoring phenomenon and recently, Mussweiler and Strack (2001b) have argued 




the SA model explains primarily semantic effects, which are obtained when 
judgmental targets (and dimensions) stay constant between the comparative and 
absolute questions. Basic anchoring primarily applies to the explanation of numeric 
anchoring effects, which may be obtained when judgmental targets change between 
the comparative and absolute questions, or, in a limited number of cases, when no 
explicit comparison between a target and an anchor was made at all (Wilson et al., 
1996; see also Brewer & Chapman, 2002). In the present work, I seek to provide an 
integrative framework for these seemingly diverse effects while also providing a 
framework for the integration of effects of anchors that are clearly implausible, within 
the context of a given judgment (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a). Given the 
relative abundance of recent research and theorizing on anchoring in social 
psychology, it is well to review the conceptual and empirical highlights of the current 
major models of anchoring. Following this review I outline a new, anchor-based 
semantic priming perspective of judgmental anchoring effects as an integrative 
alternative to the currently existing models. Finally, I present six studies that test this 
conceptualization. 
Models of Anchoring 
The SA model  
The SA model, which explains the anchoring effect in terms of a selective 
knowledge activation mechanism, assumes that when judges compare a given target 
to an anchor value, they may positively test the hypothesis that the target in question 




Theresa was older or younger than 89 years at the time or her death, judges may 
positively test the hypothesis that she was relatively old (e.g., 89 years of age) and 
actively search for specific knowledge that supports this contention  (e.g., she showed 
wrinkles on her face, walked slowly, and was less available to the media before her 
death). Similarly, when considering a lower value for her age (e.g., 45 years of age) 
judges may test the opposite hypothesis (namely that she was relatively young when 
she died), consequently constructing a ‘younger’ mental model of Mother Theresa. 
Thus, according to the SA model, in providing an answer to the comparative question, 
judges are assumed to engage in an anchor-confirmatory search of available target 
knowledge, which results in the activation of evidence in support of a unidirectional 
hypothesis (either that Mother Theresa was old in the high anchor condition or that 
she was young in the low anchor condition, e.g., Klayman & Ha, 1987; Chapman & 
Johnson, 1999; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). In the example above, estimates of 
Mother Theresa’s age would show the typical anchoring effect as a result of the 
activation of different contents of target-specific knowledge (young versus old 
features of the judgmental target, Mother Theresa). 
One of the implications of this model involves the degree to which the target 
knowledge, activated in response to the positive hypothesis testing process described 
above, is deemed relevant to a subsequent absolute estimation task (see also Higgins, 
1996; Wegener & Petty, 1995; 1997; Martin & Achee, 1992). The SA model posits 
that activated target knowledge has to be applicable to a subsequent absolute 
judgment and representative of the target of the absolute judgment (Strack & 




considerable specificity (after all, judges presumably construct a mental model of a 
specific target, along a specific judgmental dimension), changes in judgmental 
contents between the comparative and absolute questions, involving either the 
dimension or the target of the judgment, should eliminate the anchoring effect, or 
produce absolute estimates not predicted within a standard anchoring paradigm (e.g., 
contrast effects).  
A number of studies appear to support this selective accessibility mechanism, 
which has recently been extended as a general framework to explain assimilation and 
contrast effects in the area of comparative social judgments (Mussweiler, 2003). For 
example, in one study Strack and Mussweiler (1997, study 1) presented participants 
with either a high or a low anchor of the height of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin 
(Germany). Subsequently, in a standard anchoring condition, half of the participants 
received an absolute estimation task involving the gate’s height. For the other half of 
the participants, the judgmental dimension of the absolute estimation pertained to the 
gate’s width, representing a change in dimensions between the comparative and 
absolute judgments. Consistent with the notion that activation of specific target 
knowledge mediates anchoring, an anchoring effect was obtained in the standard 
anchoring condition, whereas no anchoring effect was obtained in the condition in 
which the dimension changed between the comparative and absolute judgments, 
supporting the knowledge applicability constraint of the model in producing 
anchoring effects (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). In a second study, participants 
compared the average annual temperature in Antarctica to either a high (-20 degrees 




participants were asked to provide an absolute estimate of either the average annual 
temperature in Antarctica (same target condition) or to estimate the annual average 
temperature in Hawaii (changed target condition). Results showed a standard 
anchoring effect (in the predicted direction) in the unchanged target condition, but 
revealed a contrast effect under conditions of changed targets. Specifically, 
participants in the low anchor condition gave higher temperature estimates in the 
Hawaii target condition, compared to participants assigned to the high anchor 
condition. Thus, it appears that participants may have corrected for the inherent bias 
of the knowledge generated as a result of the positive hypothesis test by contrasting 
their estimates of the average annual temperature in Hawaii away from the knowledge 
that became accessible to them during the comparative question, involving the 
judgmental target Antarctica1. 
Direct measures of knowledge activation  
The knowledge activation portion of the SA model is more directly supported 
by studies showing a reaction time advantage to anchor-consistent words in a lexical 
decision task. For example, in one study (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a, study 1) a 
group of German participants was presented either with a high or a low anchor of the 
average annual temperature in Germany, before estimating the actual mean 
temperature in Germany. Afterwards, all participants were exposed to a computerized 
                                                 
1 An alternative explanation of this finding was recently put forth by Wong and Kwong (2000) who 
argued that participants in this study may have constructed a temporary short-term memory 
representation of the absolute numerical values chosen as the temperature anchors (20 and 50). Thus, 
the contrast effect obtained in the changed target condition may have been due to a simple numeric 
priming mechanism, such as the one proposed by Wilson et al. (1996), to be described in detail later, 
rather than the result of a judgmental correction process involving considerations of representativeness 
of activated target knowledge. It should be noted that this simple numeric priming mechanism only 
explains the contrast effect in the changed target condition, and not the anchor effect in the unchanged 




lexical decision task, which contained, as part of the stimulus set, target words 
consistent with both the high temperature anchor (e.g., sun, hot, warm, beach) and the 
low temperature anchor (e.g., stove, cold, snow, frost, ski). The results showed that 
participants were faster at recognizing the ‘summer’ words in the high anchor 
condition (compared to participants in the low anchor condition) and faster at 
recognizing the ‘winter’ words in the low anchor condition (relative to participants in 
the high anchor condition). Similar results were obtained in a study varying 
comparison standards for the average price of a car (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a, 
study 2). Here, participants in the high versus low anchor condition showed anchor-
consistent lexical activations, reflecting faster responses to expensive car brands in 
the high anchor condition (compared to inexpensive car brands) and faster responses 
to inexpensive car brands in the low anchor condition (relative to the expensive car 
brands). In sum, these studies demonstrate that inducing judges to consider 
differentially valued anchors within the context of a comparative judgment bolsters 
the accessibility standard consistent knowledge, which may subsequently produce 
anchoring effects. 
Effects of implausible anchors 
The SA model was initially proposed to explain primarily the effects of 
plausible anchor values on judgmental anchoring (see Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). 
The plausibility of an anchor value is generally defined by the category to which the 
target of the judgment belongs. For example, in estimating whether a person is older 
or younger than a given anchor value, any value falling within an acceptable range of 




plausibility can vary according to the range of values, judges would find subjectively 
acceptable with respect to a given judgmental category. For example, a person might 
consider 107 years to be a plausible value for the age of a human being, while another 
person might classify this value as implausible, perhaps because the person cannot 
think of a human that is 107 years old (see also Tversky & Kahneman’s, 1974 
discussion of the availability heuristic). Similarly, the more knowledge a judge 
possesses about a given target, the smaller his/her subjective range of plausible values 
would be (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). For example, if a person knew that targets 
belonging to the category “United States Senators” are typically between 40-60 years 
old, a value of 16 years would be considered implausible, despite the fact that this 
value would fall within the range of plausible values for human age in general. Thus, 
in defining whether an anchor value is plausible or implausible, it is generally 
important to specify which primary target category judges are likely to invoke during 
the judgmental task2.  
 An initial puzzle in the anchoring literature concerned the fact that judges 
have been shown to be strongly influenced by implausible anchor values in their 
absolute estimations of a given target feature. In one study (Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997), participants were asked whether Mahatma Gandhi was older or younger than 
either 140 years or 9 years of age. Despite the implausibility of these values for 
Gandhi’s age, they produced a strong assimilation effect on subsequent absolute 
estimates: participants who received the high implausible anchor on average 
                                                 
2 The effects of differential target categorization processes on judgmental anchoring have recently 





estimated Gandhi to have lived 67 years, whereas participants who received the low 
implausible anchor thought that he was, on average, 50 years old. 
 Recently, Mussweiler and Strack (e.g., 2001a) have acknowledged that the SA 
model, in its initially proposed form, was not able to account for the effects of 
implausible anchors. For example, a judge can easily provide an answer to the 
question whether Gandhi was older or younger than 140 when he died, without first 
testing the hypothesis that Gandhi was 140 years old. Simply knowing that no 
(known) human being reaches this age suffices to answer the comparative question (at 
least in the high anchor condition). As a consequence, subsequent to any target 
comparison with an implausible anchor value, judges ought to lack the knowledge 
required to arrive at a target-specific absolute estimate, because no specific target 
knowledge had to be generated in order to answer the comparative question. Put 
differently, from a selective accessibility perspective alone, implausible anchors 
should produce no anchoring effects at all. However, as research has shown, 
implausible anchors yield large and sometimes even larger anchoring effects than 
plausible anchors (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a; but see Wegener, Petty, & 
Detweiler-Bedell, 2000 for an exception).  
 In order to fully explain the effects of implausible anchors, Mussweiler and 
Strack (2001a) therefore proposed an integration of their selective accessibility 
mechanism with an insufficient adjustment process (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; 
Jacowitz & Kahneman, 1995; Quattrone, Lawrence, Warren, Souza-Silva, Finkel, & 
Andrus, 1984). Specifically, during the comparative task, judges may compare the 




values they find plausible (see discussion above). This process would require judges 
to adjust from the implausible value to a self-set category boundary. However, simply 
adjusting the implausible anchor value to an acceptable boundary value would not 
provide judges with the specific target knowledge required to produce an absolute 
estimate. According to Mussweiler and Strack (2001a), judges solve the absolute 
judgment task by testing the hypothesis that the target is identical to the category 
boundary, which now serves as a new anchor value. Again, the positive hypothesis 
test would result in the selective activation of target-specific knowledge, which is 
then translated into an absolute estimate. Compared to the typical magnitude of 
absolute estimates, generated in response to considering plausible anchor values, 
absolute estimates in response to implausible anchors should be larger, since they are 
generated by testing the target’s extension against the tail values of a distribution of 
plausible values.   
 Converging evidence from a number of studies appears to confirm this 
conceptualization. In one paper, Mussweiler & Strack (2000a) have shown that 
responses to comparative questions are based on different types of knowledge, 
depending on the plausibility of the anchor value. As already described, solving the 
comparative question when anchors are plausible requires the generation of extensive 
exemplar knowledge (e.g., Mahatma Gandhi), whereas solving an implausible 
comparative question may simply involve knowledge about the general category to 
which the target belongs (e.g., human beings). A study investigating this logic 
showed that judges, asked to provide general category estimates (i.e., the length of the 




implausible anchor during the comparative question. Judges asked to make specific 
target estimations (i.e., the length of the Mississippi river) responded faster after 
considering a plausible anchor value (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a). 
 In some studies, Mussweiler & Strack (1997, 1999b, 2000a) were able to 
obtain differential response latencies to the comparative and absolute question, 
depending on the plausibility of the anchors. In studies varying the plausibility of the 
anchor values (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 1999b), response latencies to the 
comparative question have been shown to be relatively long in the plausible anchor 
conditions, whereas absolute judgments were made relatively more quickly. The 
reverse pattern of results was obtained for implausible anchoring tasks. These results 
are consistent with the notion that the more elaborate hypothesis testing strategy 
occurs at different stages in the anchoring paradigm, depending on the plausibility of 
the anchor value.  
 To specifically examine the adjustment component of their model, Mussweiler 
and Strack (2001a) conducted two studies varying the plausibility of the anchor along 
with the extremity of the values in the implausible conditions. As reasoned by the 
authors, if judges indeed adjust the implausible anchor values to specific category 
boundaries, then two differentially extreme anchor values (valued in the same 
direction) should yield similar absolute estimates. One study anchored judges on the 
age of Gandhi at his death, the other on average temperatures in the Antarctic. Both 
studies showed the predicted pattern of similar mean estimates of Gandhi’s age and 




implausible anchor value. As predicted, absolute estimates were larger in the 
implausible as compared to the plausible conditions.   
 Taken together, these findings seem to be supportive of the existence of a two-
stage process (adjustment plus selective accessibility) whereby judges solve 
implausible anchoring tasks. 
Summary 
The vast majority of current studies on the anchoring phenomenon seem to 
suggest that selectively activated semantics, generated in response to positively 
testing a hypothesis that the target is identical to the anchor value, theoretically 
mediate judges’ responses to a subsequent absolute judgment question. As some 
studies show, changing the semantic context during the anchoring task eliminates or 
changes the anchoring effect. Similarly, evidence from lexical decision studies 
confirms the semantic activation notion of the model. Different types of knowledge 
(category versus exemplar) may be used to solve the comparative question, depending 
on the plausibility of the anchor. In addition to selective accessibility, an adjustment 
mechanism appears to underlie the effects of implausible anchors. 
Basic anchoring as an alternative to selective accessibility 
The overwhelming amount of evidence, seemingly in support of a selective 
accessibility (plus adjustment) notion of anchoring, appears in stark contrast to the 
simple, numeric priming explanation of anchoring (“basic anchoring”), proposed by 
Wilson, Houston, Etling, and Brekke (1996). According to Wilson et al.’s work, a 




during the comparative judgment phase. This short-term memory representation of a 
number, in turn, is hypothesized to directly influence responses to subsequent 
absolute judgments, without any of the semantic constraints on anchoring, predicted 
by the SA model. Contradictory to Mussweiler and Strack’s model, Wilson et al. have 
shown anchoring effects, even when comparative and absolute judgment tasks were 
semantically unrelated. For example, in one study Wilson et al. asked one group of 
participants whether the number of nations in the UN is more or less than 1930 and 
another group whether the number of physicians in the local phonebook is more or 
less than 1930. In a subsequent absolute judgment task, all participants were asked to 
estimate the number of nations in the UN, showing anchoring effects with 
comparable effect sizes in both groups. This finding constitutes a puzzling opposition 
to the findings obtained, for example, by Strack and Mussweiler (1997) 
demonstrating the absence of an anchoring effect under conditions of changed 
judgmental dimensions (e.g., height versus width). If their selective accessibility 
process exclusively mediates all anchoring effects, then no anchoring effect should 
have been obtained in Wilson et al.’s study, since selectively activated knowledge 
regarding the number of physicians in the phonebook is irrelevant to an estimate of 
the number of African UN nations. 
Noting this inconsistency, Wong and Kwong (2000) conducted a series of 
studies, demonstrating anchoring effects under conditions of changed targets between 
the comparative and absolute judgment, replicating Wilson et al.’s (1996) findings. 
Additionally, their design incorporated a variation of the typical anchoring paradigm 




anchor values. Specifically, Wong and Kwong anchored participants on the length of 
the main runway of an airport in Hong Kong. In addition to receiving either a high or 
a low anchor value, the unit of measurement was varied such that half the participants 
received an anchor value in kilometer units and the other half in meter units. The 
anchors were chosen to be semantically identical, differing only in absolute numerical 
values (high anchors = 7300m vs. 7.3km; low anchors = 2300m versus 2.3km). The 
absolute question, for all participants, pertained to the price of a bus, changing both 
the target (from runway to bus) and the dimension of the judgment (from length to 
price). As predicted by Wilson et al.’s simple numeric priming hypothesis, the results 
showed the typical effect of considering a high versus low anchor on absolute 
judgments and an effect of unit on absolute judgments. Specifically, participants who 
received an anchor value of 7300 meters estimated, on average, the bus price to be 
higher than participants who received an anchor value of 7.3 kilometers. The same 
finding was obtained for the low anchor pair. As Wong and Kwong pointed out, these 
findings seem to undermine the selective accessibility theory of anchoring, because 
semantically equivalent anchors should have produced similar absolute estimates.  
In response to these findings, Mussweiler and Strack (2001b) conducted two 
studies that specifically addressed Wong and Kwong’s criticisms from a selective 
accessibility perspective. Further revising their work, Mussweiler and Strack (2001b) 
have recently argued that their model applies only to the kinds of anchoring effects 
initially proposed by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), or, to anchoring effects where 
semantics are allowed to operate on the absolute judgment. As they have argued, 




the comparative and absolute judgment. When targets change between the two tasks, 
pure numeric anchoring effects may still be obtained, as reported by Wilson et al. 
(1996) and by Wong and Kwong (2000). To provide evidence for this argument, 
Mussweiler and Strack (2001b) conducted a study, orthogonally varying anchor 
values (high, low), the judgmental target (same, different) and the unit of 
measurement associated with the anchor (e.g., m, km). For some participants, both 
judgments pertained to the height of a mountain, whereas for other participants, 
similar to Wong and Kwong’s design, the target was changed to the number of 
languages spoken in the world. As in Wong and Kwong’s study, high and low 
anchors differed only in terms of absolute numbers and were semantically equivalent. 
The results showed no effect of the semantically equivalent anchors (e.g., 1.6km vs. 
1,600m) when both judgments pertained to the same target, but showed a typical 
anchoring effect on height estimations of the mountain (e.g., 7.3km vs. 1.6km). Under 
conditions of changed targets, both the anchor value and the absolute value of the 
number, ignoring units, produced an anchoring effect on estimations of the number of 
world languages, replicating Wong and Kwong’s (2000) findings. 
Summary 
The latest consensus in the literature on anchoring appears to be that a set of 
distinct psychological mechanisms may produce judgmental anchoring effects. The 
operation of these processes may be dependent on a) the type of anchor used 
(plausible versus implausible) and b) on the nature of the semantic context (e.g., 
targets changed or unchanged). The effects of plausible anchors are currently 




extensive exemplar knowledge. The effects of implausible anchors are explained by 
an adjustment plus selective accessibility process, involving the use of category and 
exemplar knowledge at different stages of the anchoring task. Finally, semantics 
appear to play absolutely no role in anchoring effects that involve changed 
judgmental targets and/or dimensions (with the exception of the contrast effect 
obtained in Strack & Mussweiler, 1997, study 2). Instead, a simple numeric priming 
mechanism may be responsible for the production of anchoring effects under 
conditions of changed semantic contexts.  
While Mussweiler and Strack provide a substantial amount of converging 
evidence in support of their model and for the importance of semantics in producing 
anchoring effects, a number of important questions regarding this effect remain. For 
instance, although it appears that specific target semantics play a role in producing 
the anchoring effect (e.g., Brandenburg gate example), anchoring effects have been 
demonstrated numerous times in situations when comparative and absolute question 
were semantically unrelated (e.g., runway/bus example). What might explain this 
inconsistency? Do the effects reported by Wong and Kwong (2000) or Wilson et al. 
(1996) simply belong to a subcategory of ‘pure numeric’ anchoring effects, or do 
semantics play a role in the mediation of these effects as well? If yes, what kind of 
semantics? Can a single mechanism account for semantic and numeric anchoring 
effects?   
 In the present dissertation project, I sought to answer these questions. In 
addition to arguing for an integration of semantic and numeric effects, I propose that 




mechanism, thereby providing a more parsimonious account of the anchoring 
phenomenon. In the next section, I outline the specific features of this re-
conceptualization of the anchoring phenomenon. 
Anchor-based semantic priming: An integrative alternative 
A basic assumption of the present theory is that anchor values are mentally 
represented as words. These words semantically reflect the value of the anchor along 
a given judgmental dimension, considered by judges during the comparative 
judgment task. More specifically, it seems plausible that, while processing the 
comparative question, in which judges typically consider whether a target value is 
larger or smaller than a given anchor, judges are primed (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & 
Fazio, 1983) with words related to the anchor value itself. Importantly, these words 
are hypothesized to reflect the numerical value of the anchor along a number of 
nonspecific semantic ‘quantifiers’ such as ‘a lot’, ‘a little’, ‘long’, short’, ‘high’, 
‘low’, ‘expensive’, inexpensive’, which may vary in content as a function of a) the 
experimental design employed (anchor values high-low) and b) the judgmental 
dimension (e.g., length, height, weight, price) considered in connection with the 
category (e.g., mountains, animals, people), to which the target of the comparative 
question belongs. Via this simple priming mechanism judges are provided with a 
highly accessible, general, answer to the absolute question. Specifically, during the 
absolute estimation task, numerical estimates of the target’s extension may be 
assimilated toward the primed semantic associate of the anchor value. Such a 
conceptualization, while clearly building on insights generated from the SA model, 




used by judges to the anchor value itself and not to the target of the judgment. As a 
result, no positive hypothesis testing mechanism is assumed to be necessary for the 
solution of anchoring tasks, which allows for an explanation of the effects of 
plausible and implausible anchors, without differentiating between a ‘selective 
accessibility’ and ‘adjustment’ hypothesis. The specific details of this re-
conceptualization are discussed below, followed by a description of six studies that 
were conducted to explore it. 
The semantics of anchoring revisited 
One explanation of the anchoring effect comes from a perspective known as 
conversational relevance (Grice, 1975, discussed in Jacovitz & Kahneman, 1995). For 
instance, judges relying on the maxim of quantity, discussed by Grice, might think 
that the experimenter in the study intentionally presented them with a numerical 
standard, possibly because the experimenter knows the answer to the absolute 
question. Based on this logic, judges might simply use the anchor value as a basis for 
their estimate, because they believe that the experimenter intended to provide them 
with a ‘hint’ as to the actual value. To rule out the effects of conversational relevance, 
many researchers (e.g., Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) attempt to convince participants 
that the anchor values were chosen at random (e.g., by spinning a wheel of fortune, or 
rolling a set of weighted dice), which ought to render these anchor values, 
normatively speaking, uninformative with respect to any subsequent estimation task. 
The current consensus in the literature is that the ‘random generation’ solution 




 What appears to be somewhat of a puzzle is the fact that anchor values 
continue to influence absolute estimation tasks, despite the fact that judges likely 
believe they were randomly generated. As the following analysis will show, anchor 
values may robustly influence subsequent judgment tasks because researchers, of 
course, do not often randomly choose anchor values to present to their participants. 
Rather, they are specifically chosen by the researcher to represent high and low 
values with respect to a particular judgmental target or target category. In addition, 
numerical anchor values are not presented to judges in isolation, but are generally 
embedded in specific semantic contexts (see Wilson et al., 1996 for an exception). 
That is, whether randomly chosen or not, anchor values may prime associated 
concepts, thereby increasing the likelihood that these concepts will be used to answer 
the absolute question. A question, thus, arises as to the specific nature of these 
semantic associations.  
 Numerical values, considered in isolation, do not appear to be (semantically) 
quantifiable. For example, it would be difficult to state whether 200 is ‘a lot’ or ‘a 
little’ of something without knowing what that ‘something’ is. Of course, 
mathematically speaking, 200 is considered to be ‘larger’ than all of the numbers 
preceding it, and smaller than the numbers following it. However, in order to assign a 
semantic label reflecting its relative quantity, 200 would have to be appropriately 
contextualized. Within the anchoring paradigm, the comparative question provides 
the requisite context for the semantic labeling of the anchor value (see also 
Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). In connection with a judgmental target, such as the 




considered large, likely activating the semantic associate ‘a lot’ or words like 
‘productive’, ‘accomplished’, and ‘senior’. Conversely, embedded in a different 
context, such as the number of inhabitants of a city, 200 would be considered a small 
standard, increasing the activation of the semantic quantification ‘low’, ‘small’ or 
‘little’. Thus, the interpretation of a numeric value appears to depend on the 
contextual presentation of it, as does the direction of the semantic association 
activated in response to its consideration (e.g., high versus low)3.  
The anchor value of 200 happens to have no specific judgmental dimension 
associated with it. Rather, it simply represents the numeric quantity of the two targets 
(number of publications and number of inhabitants). Many questions used in the 
anchoring literature, however, include more specific judgmental dimensions, such as 
the height or length of a target. The semantics associated with a particular anchor 
value may be mentally represented, in addition to such general semantics as ‘a lot, or 
‘a little’, in terms of a number of more specific judgmental dimensions. For example, 
a comparative question pertaining to the length of an airport runway may prime 
judges, depending on condition, with more specific concepts such as “long” and 
“short”, whereas a question pertaining to the weight of a person might activate 
concepts such as “heavy” or “light”. Thus, in addition to the direction of the semantic 
quantification, the specific content of the semantic prime may vary as a function of 
the judgmental dimension, considered by judges. 
                                                 
3 In line with this argument, Mussweiler and Strack (2000b) have noted that the classification of a 
target as belonging to a specific category affects the plausibility of the anchor values. Additionally, 
target category membership may determine the range of values of subsequent absolute estimations. As 
they have shown, classifying an ambiguous target (e.g., “Xi Liang”) as either a person or a cultural 
possession appears to affect the estimation of the target’s age along numerical estimates implied by the 
two different categories. For example, estimates regarding the age of a cultural possession may vary by 





  Implicit in the foregoing discussion is the notion that numerical values are 
only semantically quantifiable as ‘large’ or ‘small’ in reference to, at least, the 
primary category to which the target of the judgment belongs. Unless, for example, 
the value 200 meters is referenced to a target, belonging to a known category, such as 
a television tower or an airport runway, it would be difficult to state whether 200 
meters is “long” or “short”, “high”, or “low”. A moment of reflection also reveals that 
specific target knowledge (i.e., specific knowledge about the television tower in 
Cologne or about Dulles Airport) may not be needed in order to classify the anchor 
value as ‘a lot’ or ‘a little’. Rather, simply knowing that the Cologne Tower belongs 
to a category of ‘television towers’ would provide enough information for the 
classification of the value 200 meters as ‘large’, or ‘high’ (as far as towers go) or as 
“short”, in connection with an airport runway. Thus, the present model assigns an 
important function to the target of the judgment, primarily in the sense that it 
provides information about the general category to which it is assigned at the time of 
the comparative judgment, thereby allowing for the semantic labeling of the anchor 
value. The procedure by which anchor values are selected may additionally support 
this notion. Plausibly high and low anchor values are typically chosen to be one 
standard deviation above or below a mean estimated value of the target feature, 
provided by an independent calibration group of judges (see Strack & Mussweiler, 
1997 for procedural details). Assuming a normal distribution of these estimates, high 
and low anchor values are also likely to constitute high and low values with respect to 
the general category, to which the target belongs (e.g., television towers). This fact 




related to the anchor value and may solve the absolute judgment task based on 
categorical rather than specific target knowledge. 
 It is, of course, possible for judges to know a lot more about the target of a 
given judgment than simply the category to which it belongs. In fact, anchoring 
effects have been demonstrated using expert real estate appraisers, who were shown 
to be influenced by differential price listings of the same piece of property (Northcraft 
& Neale, 1987). According to the present model, however, specific target knowledge 
may not be necessary for anchoring effects to occur, whether the judge is expert or 
not. In the example above, the real estate appraisers could have simply noticed that 
the target belonged to an intermediate price category, within which the two anchor 
values constituted plausibly high and low standards. Thus, differential activation of 
the concepts “expensive” and “inexpensive” (for a house belonging to an intermediate 
price category), during the comparative judgment, may have directly influenced 
absolute appraisals of the property value, without specific reference to the features of 
the property. To avoid confusion, the present model does not stipulate that judges 
never recruit specific knowledge about the target from memory as part of the 
comparative judgment task. For example, judges who are motivated to process 
information accurately (e.g., Tetlock, 1983) may, perhaps ironically, compound the 
anchoring bias by recruiting extensive knowledge in support of a unidirectional 
hypothesis that the target is identical to the anchor value, much in line with 
predictions derived from the SA model. The primary goal of the present work is to 
show that anchoring effects can be obtained simply as a function of anchor-based 




mediation of anchoring effects. If this analysis succeeds, it would provide the most 
general current framework for explaining a broad range of anchoring effects. 
Summary 
I’ve argued that the phenomenon of judgmental anchoring is a special case of 
a relatively simple priming process (e.g., Herr, Sherman, & Fazio, 1983). 
Specifically, comparing a given target to an anchor value may result in the activation 
of general semantic notions that are directly associated with the anchor value. The 
subsequent influence of such general concepts on absolute target estimates, according 
to my model, occurs as a function of a straightforward assimilation process, during 
which the ambiguous target of the judgment is categorized in terms of the primed 
semantic construct(s). The numerical range of the absolute estimation may depend on 
the categorization of a given target (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). Note that this 
analysis is highly consistent with a large literature in social cognition demonstrating 
the influence of primed concepts on the interpretation of ambiguous targets. For 
example, in a well-known study by Higgins, Rholes, and Jones (1977) the ambiguous 
behavior of a target person “Donald” was interpreted in terms of two different traits 
(e.g., adventurous or reckless), depending on which of the two traits was primed in an 
earlier part of the study. Alternative concepts that were inapplicable to the ambiguous 
behavior of the target (e.g., listless) were not used to form an impression of the target. 
Thus, a target behavior appears to be assimilated to a category if the category can be 
applied to the interpretation of the target information. The current model proposes 




Effects of implausible anchors 
Recall from my previous description of the SA model that an initial theoretical 
disadvantage of the model may have been its inability to explain the effects of 
implausible anchors, using notions of a positive hypothesis test that results in the 
selective accessibility of target knowledge. As a consequence, an additional 
adjustment process had to be integrated with the existing selective accessibility 
notion, effectively explaining the effects of implausible anchors in terms of a two-
stage process. 
 While there is nothing inherently wrong with Mussweiler and Strack’s 
(2001a) conceptualization, a general priming perspective may offer a more 
parsimonious alternative to their notions. From the perspective of the proposed 
model, the effects of implausible anchors can be explained in terms of the same 
mechanism, invoked to explain the effects of plausible anchors. Specifically, 
implausible anchor values are hypothesized to prime associated semantic concepts in 
the same way plausible anchor values do. However, implausible standards may prime 
more extreme semantic quantifiers than plausible standards do. Considering, for 
example, whether Gandhi was older or younger than 140 years when he died may 
prime judges with a concept ‘very old’, or simply increase the magnitude of the 
accessibility of the concept old, compared to the level of activation created in 
response to considering a plausible anchor value. Thus, judges may be primed with a, 
categorically speaking, more extreme answer, after comparisons with an implausible 
standard, which should result in more extreme absolute estimates of Gandhi’s age. 




of anchoring effects, involving implausible standards, obtained in a number of studies 
(Mussweiler & Strack, 1997; 1999b; 2001a). 
 This alternative conceptualization of the effects of implausible anchors does 
not assume that judges first adjust the implausible anchor toward a category 
boundary, before testing the hypothesis that Gandhi, for example, was of the age 
implied by the category boundary of human age. According to a general priming 
model, in response to receiving an implausible standard, judges may simply be 
primed with a generic concept (e.g., ‘very old’) that influences absolute estimates in 
terms of categorical notions of how old a ‘very old’ person is. The estimated value of 
the age of a ‘very old’ person, while likely to be close to the category boundary of 
human age, would not need to be generated by a deliberate adjustment process, 
according to my model. Put differently, judges may never actually consider whether 
Gandhi was 140 years of age and then adjust downward from that value. Rather, 
plausible and implausible anchors may simply prime differentially extreme semantic 
quantities within the category boundaries of age, for example.   
 According to this conceptualization, the magnitude of an absolute estimate, 
when influenced by an implausible standard, should be larger than those influenced 
by plausible anchor values. However, two implausible standards, differing in 
extremity in the same direction (e.g., 140 and 240 years of age), would not 
necessarily produce different absolute estimates as well. Recall, that Mussweiler and 
Strack (2001a) found that two differentially implausible standards of Gandhi’s age 
produced similar absolute estimates, citing this finding as evidence of an adjustment 




priming mechanism, both standards may have simply primed the concepts ‘very old’, 
without producing further semantic differentiations of the concept (e.g., ‘very, very, 
very old’). Put differently, once different numerical standards are perceived as falling 
outside the range of plausible values for a target, they may simply prime similar 
associates.  
 In sum, implausible anchors are hypothesized to prime related semantic 
concepts, which produce anchoring effects. The primes are hypothesized to differ 
from those of plausible anchors in that they semantically reflect more extreme 
numeric values.  
 Critics of this notion might argue that a general priming explanation may not 
adequately explain the difference in response latencies to the comparative and 
absolute question, reported by Mussweiler and Strack (1997; 1999b), whereas a 
selective accessibility plus adjustment process does. As Mussweiler and Strack 
reported, in response to considering an implausible standard, participants answered 
the comparative question (whether the target’s extension was higher or lower) 
relatively quickly, whereas responses to the absolute question were relatively longer. 
The opposite pattern of results was obtained when plausible standards were 
considered.  
 Regardless of the specific theoretical orientation adopted to explain the 
anchoring effect, there appears to be a general asymmetry between the two questions 
in the anchoring paradigm, depending on anchor plausibility. In fact, when asked to 
answer a comparative question involving plausible standards, judges may first 




Put differently, in order to provide an answer to the question whether a given target’s 
extension is higher or lower than a given (plausible) anchor value, judges may have to 
spontaneously generate an answer to the absolute question. As a result of this, an 
answer to the absolute question, following comparisons with plausible standards, is 
immediately available when judges are presented with the absolute question, 
accounting for the quick response times to that question (relative to the comparative 
judgment task). When the anchor values chosen for a comparative question are 
implausible, on the other hand, judges are able to immediately provide an answer to 
the comparative question, without first generating an absolute estimate of the target’s 
extension. Thus, when asked to provide an absolute estimate following a comparison 
task involving implausible anchors, judges may still have to generate the answer to 
the absolute question. The point here is that differential response latencies, as a 
function of anchor plausibility, are not unequivocally indicative of the operation of 
the psychological processes proposed by Mussweiler and Strack. Thus, the 
asymmetry in response times may be a function of a number of mental processes and 
not exclusively reflective of the operation of a hypothesis testing or adjustment 
process. 
Generality of the anchoring effect 
From a general, anchor-based semantic priming perspective, judgmental 
anchoring effects are not merely limited to the anchoring paradigm proposed by 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1974, in which the target of the comparative question is 
identical to the target of the absolute question. In fact, another advantage of a 




explain a wide range of effects involving changed targets and/or dimensions between 
the comparative and absolute question. For example, the same semantic concept (e.g., 
‘old’) may mean different things, yielding different absolute estimates, depending on 
the target category of the absolute judgment. Thus, a concept, such as ‘old’ may be 
initially primed in response to considering a person’s age, yet may generally 
influence a variety of age-related absolute estimations (e.g., the age of an object). Put 
differently, while the activation of anchor-based semantics is clearly dependent on the 
judgmental context of the comparative question, the subsequent use of the semantic 
prime may be relatively independent of the context in which it was activated. At the 
same time, the general priming hypothesis includes the potential to explain the 
absence of anchoring effects involving changed judgmental targets, which have been 
previously reported as well (e.g., Strack & Mussweiler, 1997). For example, after 
being primed with the concept ‘old’, in response to considering a high standard of a 
person’s age, a subsequent estimation of the price of an object may be unaffected by 
the ‘old’ prime, because the person does not associate the concept ‘old’ with 
‘expensive’. In other words, concepts primed in response to processing the anchor 
value in a comparative question, may not be indiscriminately relevant to all 
subsequent absolute estimations, consistent with the relevance notion of activated 
knowledge in much of the social cognitive priming literature (see Higgins, 1996 for a 
review). 
 However, it is also possible for initially primed concepts, such as ‘old’ to 
associatively bring to mind other concepts, such as ‘expensive’, depending on 




perspective, the presence or absence of anchoring effects, as well as the nature of the 
effect (assimilation versus contrast) under conditions of changed semantic contexts, 
may vary as a function of a) the degree to which anchor-based semantic concepts are 
associatively linked to other concepts in the judge’s mind (cf. Anderson & Bower, 
1973; Bower, 1981; Meyer & Schvaneveldt, 1971; Srull & Wyer, 1979, 1980), and b) 
as a function of factors related to the judged usability (Higgins, 1996) of information. 
I will consider these aspects in turn. 
Rule-based linkages among concepts 
The present analysis is based on the notion that the consideration of an anchor 
value, within a given context, increases the accessibility of concepts related to the 
anchor value itself, which may subsequently affect absolute target estimates, resulting 
in anchoring effects. Specifically, the target, in a judge’s mind, may be meaningfully 
evaluated in terms of purely anchor-based semantics, such as “rich”, “old”, 
“productive”, “expensive” and so forth, depending on the context of the judgment. 
From a social information processing perspective, it is also plausible that concepts 
originally primed in response to answering a comparative question, may associatively 
bring to mind other concepts. As Bower (1981) put it,  
“The contents of consciousness are the sensations, concepts, and propositions 
whose current activation level exceeds some threshold. Activation presumably 
spreads from one concept to another, by associative linkages between them.” 




Applied to the current discussion, the initial consideration of an anchor value in one 
context might activate associated concepts, which are subsequently relevant to the 
evaluation of different targets, involving different judgmental dimensions.  
To simplify the discussion of this possibility, I will define such associative 
knowledge activation processes in terms of associative rules of an “IF-THEN” variety 
(Pierro, Mannetti, Kruglanski, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2004; Holyoak, Koh, & Nisbett, 
1989). Simply put, thinking about a concept X may lead one to also think about 
concept Y because a condition exists in the judge’s mind that links the two concepts 
together. The relative nature and strength of any given associative rule between two 
concepts generally depends on a person’s subjective experience with the world. 
Specifically, I assume that persons generate associative rules of the “IF-THEN” 
variety between two concepts (or stimuli in general) because the two concepts share 
rule-relevant features. For example, persons with different occupations might learn to 
conditionally link concepts that reflect separate judgmental dimensions, based on 
their interactions with vocationally relevant stimuli. Thus, a person in the business of 
selling cellular phones might, over time, generate a rule that links the concept 
“expensive” with the concept “light” or “small”, because expensive cellular phones 
tend to be lighter (and smaller) than less expensive models. Similarly, a person 
working for a delivery company might link the concept “fast” with the concept 
“expensive” because faster delivery service is invariably more expensive than slower 
service, in the delivery business. Persons working with diamonds might develop rules 




Applied to the current topic, whether or not anchoring effects occur under 
conditions of changed judgmental dimensions may be critically dependent on the 
operation or rule-based associative processes, in response to processing a given 
comparative question. Take, again, the example of the person in the business of 
selling cellular phones. He or she might be asked to consider whether the price of a 
given item is higher or lower than either a high or a low standard of the value of the 
object. Thus, depending on condition, the person may be primed with either the 
concept “expensive” or “inexpensive”. Subsequently, after considering a comparative 
question involving the price of an object, an anchoring effect may be obtained on an 
absolute question involving the weight of a completely unrelated object. Specifically, 
in the case of the activation of a rule “if expensive then light”, or “if inexpensive, then 
heavy”, anchoring effects may be obtained on an ambiguous weight estimate, after 
considering the price of an object. In the example above, the weight of the unrelated 
object should be judged as higher in the “inexpensive” comparison condition and as 
lower in the “expensive” comparison condition, depending on the rule that is 
accessible at the time of the absolute judgment.  
Such a conceptualization also provides a straightforward explanation of 
contrast effects, which are sometimes obtained in judgmental anchoring. In the 
traditional anchoring paradigm introduced by Tversky & Kahneman (1974), one 
typically expects to find assimilative anchoring, that is, absolute estimates within the 
general direction of the anchor. Research has shown, however, that judges sometimes 
contrast their absolute estimates away from the standard (or anchor) considered in an 




explanation for contrast effects is based on meta-cognitive correction processes (e.g., 
Martin & Achee, 1992; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997, discussed in the next section), 
another explanation may be based on the possibility that certain associative rules may 
change the direction of the absolute estimates away from the initial anchor value. 
Thus, rules, conditionally linking two separate judgmental dimensions, may differ 
with respect to the directional relation between two ‘semantic values’ on those 
dimensions. In the cellular phone example above, the nature of the rule is such that a 
“high” concept (expensive) associatively brings to mind a “low” concept (light, 
small). Hence, in response to considering a high anchor value of price, a contrast 
effect may be obtained on a subsequent weight or size estimation task, provided an 
appropriate rule is sufficiently accessible and used during the judgmental task. 
Similarly, assimilation effects should be obtained under conditions of changed 
judgmental dimensions, when an associative rule links two “high” values on two 
separate judgmental dimensions, such as “if expensive, then large”. These 
possibilities add to the current literature on anchoring by providing a general 
framework for the explanation of anchoring effects under conditions of changed 
judgmental dimensions. Specific associative rules are hypothesized to determine a) 
when anchoring effects occur under conditions of changed judgmental dimensions 
and b) what direction the effect will take (contrast versus assimilation). 
Correction processes 
An absence of anchoring effects under conditions of changed dimensions, as 
well as contrast effects, can also be explained by the perceived irrelevance of 




example, the “width” of a target. There exists substantial evidence that people make 
judgments concerning the relevance or appropriateness of mentally activated 
information for a response, which in turn can determine their use of this information 
(see Higgins, 1996 for a review of the literature on judged usability). Thus, it may be 
possible for judges to actively inhibit certain pieces of knowledge if they judge them 
as inappropriate for a judgment. For example, Strack and Mussweiler (1997), 
explained the absence of an anchoring effect (e.g., Brandenburg Gate study) by 
referring to the inapplicability of activated target semantics to a judgment involving a 
changed dimension. Similarly, from a general priming perspective, the concept 
‘high’, primed during the comparative task, may have been judged as irrelevant for 
the estimation of the gate’s width.  
 Additionally, the perceived change in dimension itself, between the two 
questions, could have signaled to participants, that any knowledge activated during 
the first question, should not be used to answer the second question. 
 This analysis implies that judges who have sufficient capacity (and 
motivation) to process information may inhibit primed semantic concepts more often, 
when they perceive a change between the comparative and absolute judgment or if 
they perceive activated knowledge as irrelevant for a judgment. Conversely, judges 
low in motivation or low in cognitive capacity may assimilate a judgment to a prime, 
because they may fail to perceive the change in questions or, because they are less 
able to make informational relevance judgments.  
 Similarly, when judges perceive a change in judgmental dimensions, contrast 




the influence of the concepts primed in response to considering the comparative 
question. Strack and Mussweiler (1997) invoked this possibility to explain the 
contrast effect obtained in the Antarctica-Hawaii temperature study and would also 





The Present Research 
 
The foregoing analysis may be summarized in terms of a number of testable 
implications.  
1) Judgmental anchoring effects, involving plausible and implausible anchors, 
are hypothesized to result as a function a simple semantic priming mechanism. 
Specifically, when judges consider a numerical anchor value within the context of a 
given comparative judgment, they are primed with words related to the anchor value. 
These anchor-associated concepts are hypothesized to directly influence people’s 
subsequent absolute target estimations. Studies 1 and 2 were designed to test these 
notions.  
2)  Once people are primed with anchor-related notions in response to processing 
a given comparative question, they may (associatively) think of additional semantic 
concepts that may influence a variety of subsequent target estimations. Thus, 
depending on the nature of these associations (or rules) the influence of the anchor 
value may ‘spread’ to judgmental targets not specifically considered during the 
comparative judgment task. Study 3 tested this implication of the general semantic 
priming notion of anchoring. 
3)  Study 4 was designed to test the notion that correction processes may affect 
the extent to which anchoring effects are obtained under varying conditions of the 
anchoring paradigm. Depending on sufficient levels of cognitive capacity, judges may 
inhibit knowledge after perceiving an illegitimate change in judgmental dimensions 




study to address an existing critical evaluation (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b, study 3) 
of the idea that general, anchor-based semantics may be responsible for producing 
anchoring effects. 
4) If general, anchor-based, semantics produce anchoring effects, then 
considering a numerical value (e.g., 45) ought to prime different associated concepts, 
depending on the target of the judgment. Put differently, instead of varying the 
numerical values of the anchors as part of the comparative question, one might obtain 
anchoring effects by holding the numerical anchor constant and varying the target of 
the judgment along the same judgmental dimension. Studies 5 and 6 in this series 
were designed to test this notion, providing perhaps the most direct test of the anchor-
based priming hypothesis. 
Study 1 
The first study in this series combined the standard anchoring paradigm with a 
lexical decision task (Meyer & Schvaneveld, 1971, see Neely, 1991 for a review). In 
this task, participants read a string of letters and attempt to identify, as quickly as 
possible, whether it is a word or a nonword. Reaction times for words are quicker if a 
context that is related to the target word has been provided. For example, participants 
recognize nurse as a word more quickly if they have just read the word doctor than if 
they have just read an unrelated word, such as bread.  
 The lexical decision task was combined with the standard anchoring paradigm 
in order to assess the degree to which persons think of anchor-consistent words after 
receiving the comparative question. For example, according to the anchor-based 




words related to the concept ‘old’ in response to receiving a comparative question 
including a high standard of a target person’s age. This should be reflected in faster 
lexical decisions for words associated with the semantic category ‘old’. Conversely, 
asking participants to compare a target person’s age to a low standard should 
facilitate lexical decisions for words associated with young age. Thus, one purpose of 
the present study was to test the extent to which comparing targets to an anchor 
results in the increased accessibility of words related to the anchor values themselves, 
providing evidence that such semantic concepts may mediate anchoring effects.   
 A second, and more important, purpose of this study was to test whether the 
effects of implausible anchors are a function of the same process, assumed to underlie 
the effects of plausible anchors. Specifically, I expected an increased facilitation of 
response latencies to anchor-consistent target words when judges consider 
implausible anchor values as standards (compared to plausible anchor values). 
Consistent with the notion that implausible anchor values increase the accessibility of 
anchor-consistent words, relative to plausible anchors (see introduction), I also 
expected implausible anchors to yield stronger anchoring effects, compared to the 
effects of plausible anchors, replicating previous research on implausible anchors 
(e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2001a). 
Method 
Participants. 111 (male and female) University of Maryland students enrolled 
in an introductory psychology course participated for course credit.  
Materials. The present research was closely fashioned after the experimental 




were presented to participants on IBM compatible computers, using the MediaLab 
software package. Consistent with the classic anchoring paradigm, participants 
received question pairs including a comparative and an absolute question. 
Specifically, for each question pair, participants first indicated whether the numerical 
value of a target was higher or lower than a given anchor value before being asked to 
give an exact absolute estimate of the numerical value. All participants first received 
five identical question pairs, to provide a believable context for the cover story, 
described below. The sixth question pair included the independent variable for which 
the anchor values were varied. Hence, roughly one-fourth of the participants received 
a high plausible anchor value during the comparative question, one-fourth a low 
plausible anchor value, one-fourth a high implausible anchor value and one-fourth a 
low implausible anchor value. As part of the critical comparative question, 
participants were asked whether Mahatma Gandhi was older or younger than either 
79 or 64 years for the plausible conditions, and older or younger than 140 or 9 years 
for the implausible conditions. The order of the questions was held constant. 
 Four different categories of letter strings were used in the lexical decision 
task: words associated with old age (such as “old”, “ancient”, “mature”); words 
associated with young age (such as “young”, “youth”, “infant”); neutral words, such 
as pencil, cow, hair, and zebra; and nonwords (see Table 1).  
 In sum, study 1 is based on a 2 (high vs. low anchor) X 2 (plausible vs. 
implausible) X 2 (lexical decision for old vs. young words) mixed factorial design. 
The first two factors were manipulated between participants and the third factor 





Letter strings used in the lexical decision task (Studies 1 & 6) 
 
Word type Letter string 
 
  
Old words old, elderly, aged, adult, ancient, 
mature, senior 
Young words young, youth, child, baby, infant, 
immature, junior 
Neutral words eat, shoe, devil, sad, pencil, fall, hair, 
sobering, water, car, jacket, walk, 
clean, cow, giraffe, trunk, ice, horn, 
buffalo, horse, camel, house, zebra, 
rain, dog, loan, tiger, lake, monkey, 
table, coyote, gazelle, lion, cat 
Nonwords phrup, vapse, dwighst, thaips, clulths, 
tweivvs, fenth, skrunn, cowce, trebe, 
stromn, thwawz, tarb, swardes, crolt, 
croiced, gruiggs, gwoints, fliegue, 
demb, streeved, dweigues, soys, 
kwaughpth, phleused, blulcs, trawvs, 
tempced, wroughgnth, brepth, teene, 
tovs, flurld,  
skwoizzed, wrintse, creussed, swylch, 
shrighte, flane, snygues, plail, brighvs, 




Procedure. Participants were run in groups of 4-6, with each participant 
seated at a PC workstation. Upon arrival participants were informed that they were 
taking part in the construction of a general knowledge questionnaire. The study, 
participants were told, included a comparison of traditional methods that use general 
knowledge questions, with more modern methods that analyze how quickly and 
accurately people recognize words. It was emphasized that the purpose of the study 
was to improve the wording of general knowledge questions. Moreover, participants 




standard and that these standards had been randomly selected by using a mechanism 
similar to that of a wheel of fortune. It was pointed out that this was necessary to 
minimize the potential influence the standards may have on the answers and to 
identify the impact of different question formats. The emphasis of the random 
selection procedure was designed to reduce the informational value of the anchors 
through conversational inferences (Grice, 1975)4.  
 After receiving instruction regarding the use of a computer keyboard, 
participants were instructed to answer the comparative question by pressing 
appropriate keys, corresponding to the two possible answers to the question (higher or 
lower). To provide answers to the absolute question, participants were instructed to 
use the number pad on the keyboard. Finally, participants were told to answer 
accurately, but to move quickly through the questions.  
 Following the instruction phase, five pairs of general knowledge questions 
were presented to participants. The lexical decisions were assessed after responses to 
the sixth comparative question had been made. Two similar studies conducted by 
Strack and Mussweiler (2000a), using a lexical decision task, found that the order of 
the task within the anchoring paradigm did not affect response latencies. However, 
consistent with the theoretical assumption that anchor-consistent words theoretically 
mediate the anchoring effect, lexical decisions were assessed immediately after the 
comparative task. 
 Thus, after responding to the sixth and critical comparison question, 
participants were told that the next part of the experiment consisted of a new method 
to assess the wording of general knowledge questions. They were told that this 
                                                 




method was designed to implicitly assess general knowledge by analyzing how 
quickly people discriminate words from nonwords. It was pointed out that letter 
strings would be presented on the computer screen and that the participants’ task 
would be to indicate whether these strings constitute words or nonwords. They were 
instructed to provide the appropriate answer, using keys on the keyboard. Participants 
were told to press the “y” key as quickly as possible if a letter-string is a word and the 
“n” key as quickly as possible if it is a nonword. All participants were told to position 
their forefingers on the two keys before the word appeared on the screen.  
 The letter-strings were presented after the appearance of a focus point in the 
middle of the screen. The focus point was displayed for 400 ms, followed by a lettern 
string that remained on the screen until an answer key had been pressed. After a pause 
of 3 seconds, the next string of letters appeared.  
 The task included 10 letter strings as part of a practice trial. The 11th through 
final trials were the critical trials, including ‘old’ and ‘young’ words, neutral and 
nonwords for a total of 96 letter strings. The stimulus set contained an equal number 
of words and nonwords. The order of presentation was completely randomized.  
 After the completion of the lexical decision task, the final absolute question 
was presented. Specifically, participants were asked to provide an absolute estimate 
of Gandhi’s age. Finally, all participants were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Results 
Absolute estimates. Consistent with predictions, the anchoring effect was 
replicated. Participants provided higher estimates of Gandhi’s age after being exposed 




Additionally, an Anchor (high vs. low) X Plausibility (high vs. low) analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) yielded the predicted interaction, F(1, 107) = 5.017, p<.05. As 
the inspection of table 2 reveals, consideration of implausible anchor values yielded 
an overall larger effect, compared to the plausible anchor condition. 
Table 2 
Absolute estimates of Gandhi’s age by anchor and plausibility (Study 1). 
 
  Plausibility 
 
  High  Low 
         
         
Anchor  M  SD  M  SD 
         
High  81.40  11.20  88.21  17.75 
         
Low  72.47  14.73  65.48  18.75 
 
 
 Lexical decisions.  Following recommendations by Fazio (1990), I first 
transformed all individual reaction times using a natural log transformation, in order 
to minimize the influence of outliers. Furthermore, in order to control for individual 
differences in response times, I calculated a baseline response index by averaging 
participants’ responses to the nonwords and neutral words. Subsequently, for each 
participant, this baseline response index was subtracted from the average response to 
the old and young words, respectively. Thus, all subsequent analyses were performed 
using deviation indexes from the participants’ individual baseline of responding to the 
noncritical words and nonwords. Negative values represent responses that are faster 




As can be seen in table 3, the speed with which participants identified the old 
and the young words in the lexical decision task clearly depended on whether they 
received a high versus low anchor and whether the anchor value was plausible or 
implausible. In particular, participants in the high-plausible anchor condition 
responded faster to words related to the general dimension ‘old’, whereas participants 
in the low-plausible anchor condition were faster at recognizing words related to the 
concept ‘young’, empirically replicating earlier work by Mussweiler and Strack 
(2000a, studies 1 & 2). 
Table 3 
Response latencies for lexical decisions for old and young words by anchor and 
plausibility (Study1). 
 
  Plausibility 
 
  High  Low 
  Old word  Young word  Old word  Young word 
         
Anchor  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD)  M (SD) 
         
High  -.10 (.08)  -.09 (.08)  -.13 (.08)  -.08 (.08) 
         
Low  -.08 (.11)  -.13 (.07)  -.07 (.11)  -.15 (.10) 
Note. Deviations from the baseline speed of responding to neutral and nonwords (in 
log ms) are reported. Lower values indicate faster responses. 
 
 Secondly, and more importantly, results showed an overall stronger activation 
pattern in the implausible (vs. plausible) anchor conditions. That is, participants were 
significantly faster at recognizing “old” target words in the high-implausible anchor 
condition, compared to the high-plausible anchor condition. Similarly, participants 
were faster at recognizing “young” target words in the low-implausible condition, 
compared to the low-plausible condition. Thus, of greatest theoretical interest was the 




words) mixed-model analysis of variance (ANOVA), which yielded a significant 
three-way interaction effect, F(1, 107) = 6.370, p < .05. In addition, this analysis 
yielded a significant two-way interaction effect, namely between Anchor (high vs. 
low) and Target (old vs. young words), F(1, 107) = 26.118, p < .001, M5 (anchor 
high, old words) = -.112, M (anchor high, young words) = -.0894, , M (anchor low, 
old words) = -.0748, M (anchor low, young words) = -.140. None of the other effects 
approached significance. 
Discussion 
The results of the first study showed that answering a comparative question 
about a person’s age activated semantic notions related to the anchor values 
themselves. Specifically, participants were faster at recognizing words related to the 
concept ‘young’ in a lexical decision task after being presented with a low anchor of 
Gandhi’ age, and faster at recognizing words related to the concept ‘old’ in the high 
age anchor conditions.  
The lexical decision results, in the four plausible anchoring cells of this study, 
empirically replicate the lexical decision data obtained in studies by Mussweiler and 
Strack (2000a, studies 1 & 2), which showed, for example, that words related to either 
high or low temperatures (e.g., sun, beach, or snow, sleigh) were recognized faster, 
depending on whether participants received a high versus low anchor of the mean 
annual temperature in Germany. It should be noted here that, although the SA model 
proposes that specific exemplar knowledge (i.e., specific knowledge that supports the 
contention that the mean annual temperature in Germany is either high or low), this 
                                                 




notion was not unequivocally supported by the results obtained by Mussweiler and 
Strack (2000a, study 1), because the target words could equally well reflect general 
semantic notions related to the anchor values themselves (e.g., sun, beach and hot are 
words generally indicative of high temperatures). However, the lexical decision 
results obtained by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a) are readily interpretable in terms 
of the general priming mechanism outlined in this dissertation.  
In addition to replicating the results obtained by Mussweiler and Strack 
(2000a) in the plausible anchoring conditions, results showed that lexical decisions 
for words related to the dimensions old and young depended not only on the anchor 
values (high vs. low) but also on the plausibility of the anchor value (plausible vs. 
implausible). Specifically, comparing a target to implausibly high and low anchor 
values resulted in an increase in accessibility of general, anchor-based semantics, 
relative to the level of activation reflected in response latencies after comparisons 
with plausible anchor values. Importantly, these differences in response latencies of 
anchor-based semantics, as a function of the plausibility and the anchor values 
themselves, map on to the stronger anchoring effect obtained in the implausible vs. 
plausible anchoring conditions. To my knowledge, this is the first study in the 
anchoring literature that measured the accessibility of anchor-related words in an 
implausible anchoring condition. 
Thus, from a general priming perspective, the explanation of plausible 
anchoring effects as well as implausible anchoring effects appears to involve the same 




of accessibility of anchor-related words as a function of the anchor value and the 
plausibility of the anchor.  
To provide convergent support for a general priming model of anchoring 
effects, the second study was designed to ‘bypass’ the comparative question stage of 
the anchoring paradigm by priming anchor-related semantic concepts directly, using a 
priming technique. Specifically, participants in the second study were, depending on 
condition, primed with the concept ‘long’ or ‘short’, while working on a lexical 
decision task. Instead of using the lexical decision task to measure semantic 
activation, I modified it to prime semantic categories that were hypothesized to 
mediate anchoring effects in the domain of length judgments. Afterwards, participants 
were asked to estimate the average length of a whale. Theoretically speaking, priming 
anchor-related words directly should constitute the equivalent of presenting an actual 
comparative question and thus, should produce anchoring effects similar to those 
obtained in a standard anchoring paradigm. 
Study 2 
Method 
Participant and Design. 31 (male and female) students at the University of 
Maryland participated in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology 
course. Participants were randomly assigned to the three cells (‘long’ prime vs. 
‘short’ prime, vs. control condition) of a single factor between-subjects design. 
Procedure and Materials. Participants were run in groups of 2-6, with each 




including all related instructions and stimulus materials were presented to participants 
using the MediaLab experiment software package. Participants took part in what 
was ostensibly a pretest for the construction of a general knowledge survey. 
Participants were informed that they would first respond to a short version of a novel 
test of general knowledge, during which they had to decide as quickly as possible, 
whether a string of letters presented to them on the computer screen was a word or 
not. Following this task, participants were instructed to answer a number of general 
knowledge questions. 
Priming manipulation. I used a lexical decision task to prime the semantic 
categories long and short. The specific details related to the presentation of the letter-
strings are identical to those described in study 1 with the following exception: 
depending on condition, the words presented to participants consisted either of words 
related to the semantic category “long” (long, elongated, stretched, extended, 
expanded, lengthy, expansive) or “short” (short, puny, dwarfed, contracted, compact, 
stunted, small). Both groups of participants also received an equal number of 
nonwords (e.g., ploced, soys, teene). Thus, depending on condition, participants were 
exposed to words related to the semantic category long or short, while ostensibly 
working on a novel test of general knowledge involving the ability to distinguish 
words from nonwords. Participants in the control condition did not respond to the 
lexical decision task and directly responded to the absolute question.  
Absolute question. After completing the lexical decision task, participants 
were told that a separate part of the study was designed to pretest the wording for a 




absolute questions on a questionnaire, asking them to estimate quantities related to a 
number of different targets. The first question on the list was comprised of the critical 
dependent variable and asked participants to estimate the average length of a whale 
(in feet). Following this question, participants responded to 25 filler questions. These 
questions were included to make the cover story regarding the construction of a 
knowledge survey believable.  
Suspicion check. In order to assess whether participants6 were aware of the 
connection between the priming task and the absolute estimates they provided, I used 
a funneled debriefing procedure suggested by Bargh and Chartrand (2000). None of 
the participants reported any suspicion that the lexical decision task may have 
influenced their responses to the subsequent questionnaire. Finally, all participants 
were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
As depicted in Figure 1, participants in the “long” priming condition gave 
higher estimates of the average length of a whale (M = 91.4, SD = 49.6) compared to 
participants in the “short” priming (M = 45.36, SD = 37.41) and “control” (M = 49.8, 
SD = 26.25) conditions. An overall one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed 
a statistically significant effect, F(2, 28) = 4.355, p < .05. A subsequent analysis 
(Dunnett’s t) revealed that the difference between the “long” priming condition vs. 
control condition was statistically significant, p < .05, whereas the “short” priming vs. 
control difference was not, p > .05. Furthermore, an effect size calculation revealed 
                                                 




that the effect is comparable in size to anchoring effects obtained in prior research, 





























Figure 1. Absolute estimates by priming condition (study 2). 
   
These results provide convergent support for the notion that semantic 
concepts, reflecting general, numerical quantities, influence absolute estimation tasks 
in judgmental anchoring paradigms. Specifically, this study was designed to bypass a 
comparative judgment task involving the length of a whale and prime concepts 
similar to those that would have been activated after considering a high or low anchor 
value of the length of this target. Interestingly, despite the fact that the semantic 
categories primed during the lexical decision task were not referenced to a specific 
target (in fact, the lexical decision task appeared disconnected to participants from the 
subsequent estimation task), the estimation of the length of a whale was strongly 
influenced by these general semantic notions. Thus, this study, again, supports the 




 To further test these notions and to provide an explanation for anchoring 
effects under conditions of changed targets/dimensions, between the comparative and 
absolute question, a third study in this dissertation project was designed to 
demonstrate anchoring as a function of semantic concepts that are associatively 
linked via a conditional rule (see implication 2 of the present model). Recall that the 
existing two major models of anchoring predict that anchoring effects under changed 
semantic conditions are either driven by purely numerical representations of the 
anchor values (Wilson et al., 1996), or result in a contrast effect (Mussweiler & 
Strack, 1997, study 2), due to meta-cognitive considerations. Based on the current 
model, concepts primed in response to considering an anchor value during the 
comparative question might influence a seemingly unrelated absolute estimation (e.g., 
involving a different target and a different judgmental dimension), through the rule-
based activation of associated concepts, judgmentally relevant with respect to the 
changed target of the absolute question. This possibility was directly tested in study 3. 
Study 3 consisted of a rule-priming task, followed by an anchoring task during 
which the target of the judgment changed between the comparative and absolute 
question. Specifically, in one condition of the third study, I first primed participants 
with a rule that “if expensive, then heavy” and “if inexpensive, then light”, using a 
questionnaire-based manipulation. Since both ‘heavy’ and ‘expensive’ (inexpensive, 
light) are denotative of ‘high’ (or ‘low’) values along these two dimensions, this 
condition was designed to result in an assimilation effect during a subsequent 
anchoring task. In the second condition, I primed the opposite rule: “if expensive, 




semantic value to a low semantic value (and vice versa), which was predicted to 
result in a contrast effect. Subsequently, judges received a comparative question 
involving either a high or a low anchor of the price of an object, presumably priming 
either the concepts ‘expensive’ or ‘inexpensive’. After answering the comparative 
question, judges were asked to provide an absolute estimate of the weight of an object 
(the dependent variable). To restate, the direction of the anchoring effect, with respect 
to the weight of the target, was predicted to vary as a function of the rules primed 
during the first part of the study. 
Study 3 
Method 
Participants and Design. 43 (male and female) students at the University of 
Maryland participated in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology 
course. Participants were randomly assigned to the four cells of a 2 (high vs. low 
anchor) X 2 (‘expensive = heavy’/’inexpensive = light’ rules vs. ‘expensive = 
light’/’inexpensive = heavy’ rules) factorial design. 
Procedure and Materials. Participants were run in groups of 2-4. Each 
participant received a packet of surveys, including general instructions similar to 
those provided in studies 1 and 2. Following these general instructions, participants 
received a questionnaire entitled ‘personal knowledge’ (see Appendix). This 
questionnaire contained an adapted version of a task, designed by Erb, Fishbach, & 
Kruglanski (2002) to manipulate associations between semantic terms, presumed to 




participants were asked to answer various questions (e.g., “what is your opinion of 
George Bush? What is the size of a swordfish?), by recording their responses on one 
of two scales: one ranging between the “like” and “dislike” ends (appropriate for the 
question about Bush), the other ranging between the “small” and “large” ends 
(appropriate for the question about the swordfish). In one condition, “small” and 
“like” anchors were placed at the same end of the scale and “big” and “dislike” on the 
other, thus creating an association between the terms and presumably activating the 
“small is likable” and “big is dislikable” rules. In another condition, these terms’ 
concordance was reversed, hence activating the “large is likable” and “small is 
dislikable” rules. Erb et al. (2002) found that participants exposed to the “small is 
likable” and “big is dislikable” rules reported a greater preference for a small school 
in a message describing its virtues than participants exposed to the opposite rules. 
Using this specific methodology, for half the participants in this study, an 
‘expensive = heavy’ and ‘inexpensive = light’ rule was created, whereas for the other 
half, the opposite rule-pair was created (‘expensive = light’; ‘inexpensive = heavy’). 
Afterwards, participants received a comparative question, on a separate questionnaire, 
asking them to indicate whether the average price of a wristwatch was higher or lower 
than $10, 000 in the high anchor condition and $2 in the low anchor condition7. A 
group of participants (N=26) who participated in a pretest, and only provided absolute 
estimates related to a number of targets, spontaneously thought the average price of a 
wristwatch was $79.03 (SD = 40.8, MIN = 15, MAX = 150). Based on this 
information, I specifically chose anchor values falling outside the range of values 
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provided by this pretest group to allow for a stronger test of the rule-priming 
hypothesis. That is, the choice of implausible anchor values was made to increase the 
probability that the concept ‘expensive’ or ‘inexpensive’ would be activated, resulting 
in the activation of the rule-relevant concepts of ‘heavy’ or ‘light’. 
Immediately after responding to the comparative question, participants were 
asked to estimate the weight of the textbook (in lbs) they were currently using in their 
introduction to psychology course, which constituted the main dependent variable. 
Following this question, participants responded to 25 filler questions, to make the 
cover story of a questionnaire pretest more convincing. Finally, participants were 
debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
As the inspection of Figure 2 reveals, the anchoring effect clearly depended 
on the type of rule participants were primed with, and on the anchor values presented 
during the comparative question. Specifically, in the ‘assimilation’ rule condition 
(expensive – heavy, inexpensive – light), participants gave higher estimates of the 
weight (in lbs) of their current introduction to psychology textbook (M = 7.7, SE = 
1.00), after considering a high anchor ($10,000) of the price of a wristwatch, 
compared to participants who considered a low ($2) anchor (M = 5.19, SE = 1.2). 
This pattern of results was reversed in the ‘contrast’ rule condition. Specifically, 
when participants were primed with an ‘expensive = light’ (inexpensive = heavy) 
rule, estimates of the textbook weight were lower in the high anchor condition (M = 
2.94, SE = 1.2), compared to the low anchor condition (M = 5.77, SE = 1.00). This 




X 2 (assimilation vs. contrast rule) analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(1, 39) = 5.515, 
p <.05. Neither the main effect of anchor nor the main effect of rule-prime reached 
significance. Subsequent simple main effects analysis of the anchor effect within each 





























Figure 2. Absolute estimates by rule prime and anchor (study 3). 
 
These results clearly demonstrate that the subjective interpretation of the 
anchor value itself along a specific semantic dimension (activated via specific rule-
primes) can yield contrast or assimilation effects in anchoring. It is worth noting here 
that there may exist a virtually limitless number of subjective rules, linking together 
judgmental dimensions such as “expensive” and “heavy” or “expensive” and “light”, 
depending on a person’s subjective experience of the world. Thus, the concept 
‘expensive’ might associatively influence a judgment of weight, if a person thinks of 




inexpensive ones). This association could yield contrast effects in a variety of weight 
related estimates, irrespective of specific targets. Similarly, the concept ‘expensive’ 
might associatively prime the concept ‘heavy’ if the person thinks (situationally) of 
diamond rings. Intriguingly, chronic associations may develop between judgmental 
dimensions frequently encountered by persons of different occupations, ages, 
backgrounds, etc., producing either contrast or assimilation effects on estimation 
tasks. These implications have yet to be fully explored.  
Finally, adding to the current activation literature, the above results were 
obtained despite the fact that targets changed between the comparative and the 
absolute question and no applicable target-knowledge was accessible, inconsistent 
with predictions derived from the SA model. Specifically, according to the SA model, 
judges in the high watch-price condition would have positively tested the hypothesis 
that the average price of a watch is equal to the $10,000 standard, thereby activating 
standard consistent knowledge that watches are relatively expensive. In the opposite, 
low anchor condition, participants would have tested the opposite hypothesis, namely 
that watches are generally inexpensive. According to the SA model, the selectively 
activated knowledge about watches, however, would not have been relevant to a 
subsequent estimation of the weight of a textbook, predicting no anchoring effect 
under these conditions. Similarly, a simple numeric priming perspective (Wilson, 
Houston, Etling, & Brekke, 1996) also cannot account for these findings, because it 
would simply predict assimilation effects in both conditions (e.g., higher estimates 
after considering a high anchor vs. low anchor), irrespective of rule priming. The 




in producing anchoring effects, while also providing an explanation for assimilation 
and contrast effects in comparative judgment tasks.  
While the first three studies reported herein appear to provide consistent 
support for an anchor-based semantic priming mechanism, this specific mechanism 
was recently considered as an alternative explanation to some of the findings reported 
under the SA model (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a). Consider, again, the lexical 
decision task findings reported by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a), described earlier. 
Combining a standard anchoring task about average temperatures in Germany with a 
lexical decision task, these authors found that responses to target words such as hot, 
warm, summer, beach, swim, sun, sea and oven, cold, snow, ski, winter, sleigh were 
differentially facilitated, depending on whether participants received a high or a low 
temperature value during the comparative task. As Mussweiler and Strack 
acknowledged,  
“[…] the obtained results may also be explained by a simple priming 
mechanism. More specifically, one may argue that processing the given anchor value 
directly increases the accessibility of words that are associated with the anchor 
value. […] As a consequence, anchor-consistent words are recognized faster in a 
lexical decision task” (Mussweiler and Strack, 2000a, p. 1044).  
Apparently, Mussweiler and Strack considered the possibility that a general 
semantic priming mechanism may be responsible for the production of anchoring 
effects. However, since “[…] the selective generation of knowledge about the target 
constitutes the core aspect of [their] model, […]” (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a, p. 




of studies, participants in a self-anchoring task were asked to indicate, for example, 
whether they knew more or less than 30 or 10 countries and their capitals. For half the 
participants, a subsequent absolute estimate referred to their actual geographical 
knowledge, whereas for the other half, the absolute question pertained to their 
father’s geographical knowledge. This study revealed an anchoring effect when 
participants estimated their own knowledge, after comparing their knowledge to a 
high or low standard, but found no anchoring effect with respect to their father’s 
knowledge. Mussweiler and Strack interpreted this finding as evidence against a 
general priming mechanism, since general semantics associated with the anchors 
should have influenced the knowledge of the ‘other’ target as well.  
 This finding obtained by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a), on the surface, 
appears to invalidate the notions put forth in this dissertation. Indeed, from a general 
priming perspective, general concepts related to knowledgeability, activated during 
the comparative task, should (logically) have influenced the estimation of the ‘other’ 
target as well. How may this inconsistency be reconciled with the studies already 
described in this project? An explanation may involve a testable assumption 
concerning the use of information under conditions of changed contextual parameters 
(e.g., a change in targets from one question to another). Participants in the 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000a) study, at the time of the absolute judgment, may have 
made a meta-cognitive judgment, in which they classified the self-knowledge prime 
as irrelevant, with respect to a judgment about their fathers’ knowledge (see 
implication “4” of this model). Specifically, participants who were asked to estimate 




judged any knowledge, activated in response to considering a ‘self’ question, as 
inappropriate to answer the ‘other’ question. Note that this explanation would be 
equally applicable to the SA model and the anchor-based semantic priming model. 
That is, both specific target knowledge, as well as general anchor-based semantics, 
could potentially have been inhibited by participants in Mussweiler and Strack’s 
(2000a) study, resulting in the absence of an anchoring effect when the target changed 
from self to other. 
The ability to inhibit knowledge or notice an ‘inappropriate’ change in 
judgmental targets should be dependent one’s level of cognitive capacity, a parameter 
known to affect the processing of a large variety of judgments (e.g., see Chun, 
Spiegel, & Kruglanski, 2002). Thus, reductions in cognitive capacity at the time of 
the absolute judgment may decrease a judge’s ability to make meta-cognitive 
usability judgments, or notice the change in targets as an ‘alert’ signal to inhibit the 
prime (see also Martin & Achee’s, 1992 notion of ‘resetting’ in judgmental tasks). 
Following this logic, under cognitive load, judges may actually assimilate the ‘other’ 
judgment to the general prime, activated during a ‘self’ judgment. Under conditions 
of normal capacity, Mussweiler and Strack’s findings (2000a) should replicate, 
because judges have the ability to notice the change in targets and meta-cognitively 
inhibit irrelevant information.8 Study 5 was designed to address these questions, 
empirically. 
                                                 
8 It should be noted that a change in judgmental targets between comparative and absolute questions 
may not always be perceived as a warning signal to inhibit knowledge that was activated during the 
comparative question. For example, participants may not think that consecutive questions about the 
age of a person and the price of a watch are intentionally linked within a ‘general knowledge’ 
experiment. However, being asked to compare one’s own geographical knowledge to a standard before 
being asked to estimate one’s father’s geographical knowledge are likely to be perceived as two 






Participants. 75 (male and female) students at the University of Maryland 
participated in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Procedure and Materials. Participants were, again, recruited under the pretext 
of a study designed to pretest the construction of a general knowledge questionnaire. 
After receiving seven identical practice question-pairs, all of the participants 
responded to the critical anchoring questions. The content of the critical comparative 
questions was identical to the one used by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a). Only the 
anchor values chosen for this study were changed. Specifically, a group of 
participants serving as a calibration group (N=26) gave responses to only the absolute 
questions used in this study. The anchor values that were chosen constituted values 
falling roughly one standard deviation above and below the mean of the estimates 
provided by the calibration group. Thus, the anchor values were equally extreme as 
those chosen by Mussweiler & Strack (2000a), but were calibrated to reflect the 
knowledge of University of Maryland students. All comparative questions pertained 
to the self as the judgmental target. For example, in the first question, participants 
were asked whether they would be able to list more or less than either 4 or 26 
countries and their capitals and whether they would be able to list more or less than 2 
or 14 US rivers.  
                                                                                                                                           





 Depending on condition, participants were then informed that they would 
have to respond to the next general knowledge question, while trying to remember an 
8-letter nonsense syllable (DBHNRKTY). They were told that people commonly 
have to remember a large amount of information while simultaneously working on a 
task and that trying to remember the 8-letter nonsense syllable would more accurately 
reflect conditions in real life. The other half was simply asked to give an exact 
estimate of how many countries/capitals and rivers they knew or provide an estimate 
with respect to their father’s knowledge. It should be noted that in Mussweiler and 
Strack’s study, the absolute question was replaced with a self vs. other free 
description task. Specifically, participants were asked to describe themselves or their 
father for a few minutes and that the foremost interest of the researchers was in their 
or their father’s factual knowledge. For the sake of simplicity (and generalizability to 
the anchoring domain), the study conducted in this dissertation included a standard 
absolute question, which asked participants to provide a numerical estimates of how 
many rivers and countries/capitals they knew. 
 Thus, this study was based on a 2 (anchor high vs. low) X 2 (cognitive load 
vs. no load) X 2 (self vs. other as target of absolute judgment) design. 
Results and Discussion 
An initial analysis of the data revealed no significant difference of question 
content (countries/capitals vs. rivers) on the pattern of results obtained in this study. 
As a consequence, an overall 2 (anchor high vs. low) X 2 (load vs. no load) X 2 (self 
vs. other as target of absolute judgment) analysis of variance (ANOVA) was 




capitals and US rivers). The analysis revealed only a significant main effect of 
anchor, F(1, 66) = 18.722,  p < .001 and a main effect of target, F(1, 66) = 10.063, p 
<.01. As the inspection of Figure 3 reveals, participants consistently provided higher 
estimates of geographical knowledge in the high anchor condition, compared to the 
low anchor condition. Furthermore, the main effect of target indicated that 
participants gave higher average estimates of their father’s knowledge (M = 27.31, SE 
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Figure 3. Absolute estimates of geographic knowledge (countries + capitals,  
and US rivers combined) by anchor, target and load (study 4). 
 
The anchoring effect occurred irrespective of whether the absolute judgment 
pertained to the self or to another person (participants’ fathers) and irrespective of 
load. Specifically, I had expected participants in the four ‘no load’ cells to only be 
influenced by the anchor values when the absolute question pertained to themselves 




pertained to their father’s knowledge. Thus, I had expected to find an interaction 
between target and anchor in the ‘no load’ condition, but not in the load condition. 
The results of this study failed to reflect this particular pattern.  
 The results obtained in this study are readily interpretable in terms of the 
anchor-based priming mechanism outlined in this dissertation, which predicts that 
general semantic notions mediate anchoring effects across a range of targets (e.g., self 
and other judgments). However, due to the assumed operation of meta-cognitive 
correction processes, I also expected an absence of an anchoring effect when the 
target of the judgment was perceived to have changed (from self to other, involving 
the same question), given participants’ sufficient capacity to notice the change (i.e., in 
the ‘no load’ condition). Thus, in the ‘no load’ condition, this study fails to replicate 
the findings obtained by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a, study 3), who showed that 
free descriptions of their participants’ own knowledge were influenced by the anchor 
manipulation, whereas descriptions of the participants’ father’s knowledge were not.  
 One obvious explanation for the difference in results obtained between the 
two studies involves the variation in the measures of the dependent variable. Whereas 
Mussweiler and Strack (2000a) engaged their participants in a free description task, 
involving general knowledge, participants in the present study were simply asked to 
provide a numerical estimate of general knowledge (consistent with the typical 
anchoring paradigm). It seems plausible that participants, who were asked to provide 
a ‘snapshot’ numerical estimate of their father’s geographical knowledge, may have 
failed to inhibit the anchor-based prime concerning their own geographical 




without much thought, even in the ‘no load’ condition. When participants, on the 
other hand, were induced to write about their father’s general knowledge, they may 
have been more thoughtful in the way they chose to characterize their fathers, hence 
inhibiting the self-knowledge prime. These possibilities point, perhaps, to a difference 
in the extent to which anchor-based primes exert their influence under conditions of 
changed targets, depending on the nature of the judgmental task at hand. Specifically, 
when the judgmental task involves only a ‘quick and dirty’ numerical estimate, 
judges may provide it without paying much attention to the fact that knowledge, 
primed prior to the estimation task, may be irrelevant (e.g., under conditions of 
certain changes in context). On the other hand, when the judgmental task is inherently 
more effortful and lengthy (e.g., a free description task), anchor-based primes may be 
more readily inhibited under conditions of changed targets, because judges are likely 
to be more thoughtfully engaged in those types of tasks, given sufficient levels of 
motivation or cognitive capacity. A follow-up study, using Mussweiler and Strack’s 
(2000a, study 3) free description task, along with the load manipulation, is currently 
being conducted. Provided the above logic is correct, this follow-up study should 
replicate Mussweiler and Strack’s (2000a) findings in the ‘no load’ conditions and 
replicate the pattern of results obtained in the present study under load conditions 
(e.g., anchoring effects irrespective of target). If these results were obtained, they 
would provide a general explanation for the typical robustness of the anchoring 
effect, using numerical estimates as dependent variables, and for the absence of the 
effect under conditions of changed targets, involving measures of the dependent 




Regardless of the outcome of this follow-up study, the apparent robustness of 
the anchoring effect, as evidenced in this study by a) an effect across different 
judgmental targets (self vs. other) and b) an effect that resulted independent of load, 
appears striking. Furthermore, this generality of the anchoring effect appears to 
strongly afford the conclusion that general semantic notions related to the anchor 
values themselves may be at work. However, although notions of positive hypothesis 
testing and selective accessibility (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) are unable to account 
for these results, one could argue that the basic (numeric) anchoring mechanism 
proposed by Wilson et al. (1996) provides a ready explanation for the patterns 
observed in study 4. Simply put, a short-term memory representation of the anchor 
value itself could have influenced the estimates of geographic knowledge in this 
study, accounting both for the effect across targets (self vs. other) and the load 
independence of the effect.  
In order to provide more unequivocal support for the anchor-based semantic 
priming explanation of anchoring effects under conditions of changed judgmental 
targets, I chose to vary the typical anchoring paradigm in a fifth study. Consider again 
the nature of the comparative question in the typical anchoring paradigm, in which 
judges consider either a high or a low anchor value as a comparison standard. While 
the anchor values vary between subjects, the target of the comparative question is 
generally not varied. As a result, judges may be primed with different semantic 
notions, because the anchor values have different meanings, but in connection to the 
same target. For example, after being asked whether former President Clinton is older 




category ‘old’. A lower standard of his age (e.g., 18 years) would prime the opposite 
concept ‘young’. Within the context of this specific paradigm, however, it is 
relatively difficult to tease apart whether judges are indeed influenced by general 
semantic notions related to the anchor values, or, alternatively, by the numerical 
values themselves, in arriving at an absolute estimate (Wilson et al., 1996). This is 
especially so when the target of the absolute judgment is different from the target of 
the comparative judgment (e.g., see results of study 4).  
Perhaps the most direct test of the anchor-based semantic priming 
explanation, thus, would involve a variation of the typical paradigm, in which the 
numerical anchor values are held constant in a between-subjects design (e.g., the 
design employs identical numerical anchor values), but the target of the comparison is 
varied in such a way that the same number (or anchor value) primes different 
semantic concepts, depending on the nature of the target9. An obtained anchoring 
effect, using this design, could not be accounted for by a pure numeric priming 
explanation of anchoring, because the numerical values are identical between 
conditions.  
To test these notions, I employed a comparative question involving the age of 
two targets, using the same numerical anchor value as a comparison standard. 
Specifically, depending on condition, participants either received a comparative 
question involving a well-known ‘older’ target person or a well-known ‘younger’ 
target person. Participants in both conditions received the same anchor value, which 
                                                 
9 While prior research has shown (Mussweiler & Strack, 1999) that the same number (e.g., 3000) can 
vary in perceived plausibility as a function of different target categorizations (e.g., height of a 
mountain, age of a person), this research still employed the traditional version of the comparative 
question, varying the anchor values (high vs. low) in addition to the categorization of the target (e.g., 




fell roughly in the middle of a range of values considered plausible for human age. 
Thus, in one condition, in which the ‘young’ target was compared to the anchor, I 
predicted the concept ‘old’ to be primed, because the anchor value constituted a high 
standard of the target person’s age. Following the same logic, when the ‘old’ target 
person was compared to the identical anchor value, the concept ‘young’ was 
predicted to be primed (again, because the anchor value would be considered a low 
standard of the person’s age). Following the comparative judgment phase, all 




Participants and Design. 24 (male and female) students at the University of 
Maryland participated in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology 
course. They were randomly assigned to the two cells of a modified anchoring design.  
Procedure and Materials. As in the previous four studies, participants 
participated under the pretext of a study, designed to develop different wordings for 
general knowledge questions. After receiving general instructions similar to those 
used in the first four studies, all participants responded to 8 filler questions (absolute 
estimation tasks regarding a number of different targets). Afterwards, the critical 
independent variable was presented. Depending on condition, participants were asked 
to indicate whether pop singer Britney Spears was older or younger than 45 years, or 
whether Hollywood actor Clint Eastwood was older or younger than 45 years. These 




‘young’. Pre-testing (N = 26) prior to this study had revealed that students generally 
knew a) who Britney Spears and Clint Eastwood were and b) that Britney Spears was 
relatively young and Clint Eastwood relatively old. The anchor value was chosen to 
reflect the midpoint of a range of plausible values for human age, which therefore 
constituted a high standard for Spears age and a low standard for Eastwood’s age. 
Following this manipulation, all participants were asked to estimate the ideal age of a 
bottle of French red wine, before it should be opened. This question constituted the 
main dependent variable. Finally, all participants responded to a number of filler 
questions, before they were debriefed, thanked and dismissed. 
Results and Discussion 
The anchoring effect was replicated. The results of a one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) showed that participants gave higher estimates of the ideal age of 
a bottle of French red wine in the Britney Spears comparison condition (M = 27.68, 
SD = 15.16, N = 13), relative to the Clint Eastwood comparison condition (M = 14.88, 
SD = 13.43, N = 11), F(1, 22) = 4.709, p < .05. 
 These results appear to strongly afford the conclusion that absolute estimates 
in anchoring tasks may be based on general semantic notions, directly related to the 
anchor value itself. Specifically, when the anchor value (45 years) was presented as a 
comparison standard for the age of a young person (Britney Spears), participants gave 
higher estimates of the age of an unrelated target (French Wine), presumably because 
the concept ‘old’ became activated after processing the comparative question. That is, 
because of the generality of the concept ‘old’ (as opposed to target-specific 




influenced a subsequent estimate of the age of a bottle of wine, despite the fact that 
the concept was activated in a different context. Similarly, when the same anchor 
value served as a standard of comparison for an older person (Clint Eastwood), 
participants appeared to have been primed with the concept ‘young’ (45 years 
constituted a low standard for the his age), resulting in lower estimates of the age of a 
bottle of wine.  Because the anchor values themselves were specifically not varied in 
this study, an interpretation of these results based on a numerical priming perspective 
(Wilson et al., 1996) can be ruled out. 
 With pure numerical priming ruled out, could Strack and Mussweiler’s (1997) 
SA model account for this finding? The answer appears to be negative. According to 
their model, participants in the Britney Spears condition presumably tested the 
hypothesis that Britney Spears was 45 years old, thereby activating standard-
consistent knowledge about her (e.g., specific knowledge that she is relatively old). 
Similarly, participants testing the hypothesis that Clint Eastwood was relatively 
young (e.g., 45 years of age) presumably activated knowledge about the actor that 
would be consistent with the notion that he is young. According to the SA model’s 
‘representativeness’ constraint of activated knowledge, no anchoring effect (or a 
contrast effect indicating over correction) should have been obtained, because the 
target of the absolute judgment (involving French red wine) was not representative of 
either target of the comparative judgment (Britney Spears, or Clint Eastwood). Thus, 
the present results also rule out the SA model as an explanatory framework for this 




 One weakness of the current design is that it does not rule out a third 
alternative interpretation of the obtained pattern of results, not predicted by any of the 
current models of anchoring. Specifically, while thinking about Britney Spears, 
participants may have been primed with the concept ‘young’, after providing an 
answer to the comparative question. Because every participant in this study indicated 
that Britney Spears was younger than 45 years, they may have been primed with the 
concept young, rather than the concept old, after processing the comparative question. 
Similarly, because every participant indicated that Clint Eastwood was older than 45 
years, participants in this condition may have been primed with the concept old, 
rather than the anchor-based concept of young. Within the context of this alternative 
priming mechanism, the obtained results may have been due to a contrast effect. That 
is, the higher estimates of age of the bottle of wine in the Britney Spears condition 
(compared to the Clint Eastwood condition) may have been the result of an over 
correction process: Participants may have perceived a change in targets between the 
comparative question involving the age of a celebrity and the age of a bottle of wine, 
and corrected for the potential influence of the alternative ‘young’ prime in the Spears 
condition and the ‘old’ prime in the Eastwood condition on their estimates of wine 
age.  
It should be noted here that this explanation appears to be an unlikely 
candidate to explain these results, because the design of this study was essentially 
analogous to a study involving implausible anchor values. More specifically, the 
value 45 is clearly an implausible candidate for both Britney Spears and Clint 




implausible anchors (e.g., “was Mahatma Gandhi older or younger than 140 years?”). 
In most implausible anchoring paradigms, the actual answer to the comparative 
question does not appear to influence the effect at all. In fact, as previously 
mentioned, most implausible anchoring studies yield stronger anchoring effects, 
compared to plausible anchoring studies. Thus, despite the fact that participants 
generally know that the answer to the comparative question is lower or higher than an 
implausibly high or low anchor value, the fact that absolute estimates are almost 
always consistent with the implication of the anchors, does not appear to indicate that 
the actual answer to the comparative question primes participants with values 
opposite to those implied by the anchor value (e.g., an answer “younger than 140 
years of age” does not appear to prime “young”). 
 Be that as it may, a final, sixth study was conducted to rule out this alternative 
explanation, replicating and extending the results obtained in study 5. Using the 
combined anchoring and lexical decision task paradigm employed in study 1, study 6 
sought out to demonstrate an increased level of lexical activation of the concept ‘old’ 
in the Britney Spears condition, relative to the level of activation of the concept 
‘young’ in that condition. Similarly, I predicted a higher level of lexical activation of 
the concept ‘young’ in the Clint Eastwood condition, relative to the concept ‘old’. To 
add to the generality of the modified anchoring paradigm introduced in study 5, the 
dependent variable in study 6 pertained to the age of a person, as opposed to the age 






Participants. 26 (male and female) students at the University of Maryland 
participated in exchange for course credit in an introductory psychology course. 
 Procedure and Materials. The procedure and materials used in this study were 
identical to those used in study 5 with the following exceptions. All materials were 
presented on IBM-compatible workstations using the MediaLab software program, 
instead of questionnaires. Following the general instruction phase and the filler 
questions, participants received either the Britney Spears or Clint Eastwood 
comparison question, before being told that the next section would test their general 
knowledge in a novel way. Participants then received instructions on how to respond 
to the lexical decision task. The stimulus materials (e.g., letter strings), and 
procedures used in the lexical decision task were identical to those used in study 1. As 
in study 1, the task included words related to the semantic categories ‘old’ and 
‘young’, as well as unrelated words and nonwords (see table 1 for letter strings used 
in this task). After participants completed the lexical decision task, they were 
presented with the dependent variable. Specifically, they were asked to estimate the 
age of current US senator Robert Bennett (R-UT). Finally, participants responded to 





Results and Discussion 
Absolute estimates. The results of this study replicated the anchoring effect 
obtained in study 5. Specifically, participants gave higher estimates of senator 
Bennett’s age in the Spears condition (M = 58.23, SD = 6.77, N = 13), compared to 
the Eastwood condition (M = 51.38, SD = 6.76, N = 13). A one-way analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) performed on these estimates yielded a statistically significant 
effect, F(1, 24) = 6.651, p < .05.  
 Response latencies. As in study 1, all individual response latencies were first 
transformed, using a natural logarithmic transformation. Subsequently, individual 
baseline indexes of responding were calculated by averaging individual responses to 
the noncritical words and the nonwords. For each participant, this index was 
subtracted from the average responses to the ‘old’ and ‘young’ words, respectively. 
Thus, the index used in the subsequent analysis constituted participants’ individual 
deviations from their baseline speed of responding. Negative values represent 
responses that are faster than this baseline; positive values represent responses that 
are slower. 
 As the inspection of table 4 reveals, participants’ responses to the old and 
young words depended on whether they compared Britney Spears’ age to the 45-year 
anchor or Clint Eastwood’s age to that same anchor. Specifically, participants were 
faster at recognizing ‘old’ related words in the Spears condition, compared to the 
Eastwood condition. Conversely, participants in the Eastwood condition were faster 
at recognizing ‘young’ related words, compared to the ‘old’ related words. This 




X 2 (old vs. young words) mixed model analysis of variance (ANOVA), F(1, 24) = 
12.184, p < .01. None of the other main effects reached significance.  
Table 4 
Response latencies for lexical decisions for old and young words by anchor 
(Study6). 
 
  Target 
 
  Old Words  Young Words 
        
        
Anchor  M SD  M  SD 
        
High 
(Spears)  -.174 .064  -.129  .067 
        
Low 
(Eastwood)  -.045 .075  -.158  .096 
Note. Deviations from the baseline speed of responding to neutral and 
nonwords (in log ms) are reported. Lower values indicate faster responses. 
 
 The results obtained in this study further demonstrate the profound influence 
of anchor-based semantics on judgmental anchoring and provide additional evidence 
for the operation of this mechanism. Specifically, analyses of response latencies to 
anchor-based semantics in a lexical decision task indicated that participants were 
clearly primed with the anchor-based concept ‘old’ in the Britney Spears condition 
and, to a somewhat lesser degree, with the anchor-based concept ‘young’ in the Clint 
Eastwood condition. Thus, the pattern of response latencies obtained in this study 
provides strong evidence against the alternative explanation of the results obtained in 
study 5 and 6. In particular, because the lexical activation pattern is consistent with 
the anchoring effects obtained in both studies, it seems unlikely that participants were 




comparison question, and with the concept ‘old’ after processing the Clint Eastwood 
comparison question.  
 In sum, the anchoring effects obtained in studies 5 and 6, in combination with 
the lexical decision results obtained in study 6, strongly afford the conclusion that 







Individuals are often faced with significant amounts of uncertainty when it 
comes to a wide array of judgmental tasks and decisions in their daily lives. Persons 
might, for example, wonder how much money they should offer for a piece of real 
estate, whether they are being paid enough at their jobs, whether they should go to 
Hawaii or Barbados for vacation, or how they are measuring up to a faceless 
competition on the current job market, and so forth. These and many other questions 
are often difficult to answer from within an informational vacuum. Having access to 
at least some kind of comparison standard, within a given judgmental context, 
typically proves to be of significant informational value. For example, to know the 
average amount of money that was paid for a piece of real estate in the past provides 
information as to how much one should currently offer for the object. To know that a 
colleague gets paid a certain amount of money to do a type of work similar to one’s 
own professional responsibilities, helps in determining whether one should ask for a 
raise or not. Or, to know that a position had over 100 applicants, but another had only 
20, would aid in determining the respective desirability or competitiveness of the two 
positions, and so forth. Social psychologists have long recognized the importance and 
usefulness of comparison standards within the domain of social judgment (e.g., 
Festinger, 1954), and so, the fact that standards of comparison are frequently sought 
out by individuals as important sources of information is hardly surprising, and 




What has puzzled psychologists for three decades now, based on the 
groundbreaking research by Tversky and Kahneman (1974), is the apparently 
irrational tendency for individuals to be influenced by completely uninformative 
comparison standards, in reaching a judgment about a target. Studied primarily in the 
domain of numerical comparisons and judgments, individuals have, time and again, 
been shown to base their estimations, related to a host of targets, on (ostensibly) 
randomly selected, and hence uninformative, standards of comparison. While 
psychologists have spent much of the last 30 years demonstrating this type of 
anchoring effect, in a variety of judgment and decision-making domains, a recent 
influx of theoretical contributions to the social judgment literature has begun to shed 
promising light on the psychological processes that may be involved in judgmental 
anchoring effects.  
 The key purpose of the present dissertation project was to integrate the major 
existing theoretical notions of anchoring into a single mechanism that can account for 
a broad range of anchoring effects. I essentially proposed that a comparison of a 
given target with a numerical anchor activates semantic notions that are directly 
related to the anchor value. A subsequent absolute estimate of the target feature was 
hypothesized to be based on the semantic notions related to the anchor values, and not 
necessarily on the anchor values themselves (Wilson et al., 1996), or on target 
specific knowledge that was activated in response to a positive hypothesis test (Strack 
& Mussweiler, 1997). 
 Study 1 supported the hypothesis that anchor-based semantics may be 




anchor values appear to be associated with different levels of activation of anchor-
related words. Specifically, using response latency data, the results of study one 
showed that comparisons with implausible anchors result in an increased activation of 
words related to the anchor values, compared to comparisons with plausible anchors. 
These differences mapped on to a larger anchoring effect obtained in the implausible 
vs. plausible condition, providing an explanation for the larger effects of implausible 
anchors. In study 2, participants were primed directly with anchor-related words, 
which resulted in a ‘mimicked’ anchoring effect. Thus, although no specific target-
anchor comparison was made, participants assimilated their numerical estimates of a 
target (the average length of a whale) to a set of primed constructs that presumably 
reflected notions related to high and low anchors of the length/size dimension, used in 
this study. Study 3 showed that associatively activated concepts, primed via a 
conditional rule, produce anchoring effects when the target and dimension of the 
judgment change between the comparative and absolute questions. The pattern of 
results obtained in study 3 also provided evidence for the prediction that associative 
knowledge activation processes may be responsible for producing contrast effects in 
anchoring. Study 4 failed to support the prediction that a target change between a 
comparative task and related absolute estimate, involving the same judgmental 
question, inhibits anchoring. Nonetheless, this study was strongly supportive of a 
general semantic priming mechanism, evidenced by the robustness of the anchoring 
effect, which was obtained across different targets (self v. other) and independent of 
cognitive load. Study 5 varied the typical anchoring paradigm by holding the 




producing a purely semantic anchoring effect. Finally, study 6 replicated and 
extended the findings obtained in study 5, providing additional evidence (from a 
lexical decision task) that anchor-based semantic notions mediate anchoring effects. 
Relation to the SA model 
The theory of anchor-based semantic priming, proposed in this work, is 
directly based on insights gathered from the selective accessibility work of Strack and 
Mussweiler, and in many ways constitutes a simplification of the basic SA process. 
My perspective primarily differs from existing notions of selective accessibility in the 
kinds of semantics that are assumed to mediate anchoring effects and in the role of 
target-knowledge in anchoring. Specifically, I assume that a positive hypothesis 
testing mechanism that increases the accessibility of selective target knowledge may 
not constitute a necessary mechanism for anchoring effects to obtain. In making an 
ambiguous numerical estimate of a target quantity, judges may simply base their 
estimations on a general semantic concept or category that is primed during the initial 
target-standard comparison. For example, when comparing Mother Theresa’s age at 
her death to a high anchor value (e.g., 89) a general concept such as “old” may be 
primed, which subsequently forms the basis of the absolute estimate. Similarly, 
comparing her age to a low anchor would prime the opposite concept (“young”). A 
large number of studies in the social-cognitive literature support the contention that 
target evaluations may be influenced by the accessibility of general concepts. In what 
is probably the most well-known study of this kind, Higgins, Rholes, and Jones 
(1977) demonstrated that an ambiguous behavior of a target person “Donald” was 




on which one of the two traits was primed in an earlier part of the study. An 
assumption that judges positively test the hypothesis that Donald is either 
adventurous or reckless is not needed to explain these kinds of knowledge 
accessibility effects. Rather, judges may simply perceive the subjective relevance of 
the activated trait concept (e.g., reckless) for the interpretation of the ambiguous 
target behavior. 
This simplification of the SA process allows for an integrated explanation of 
implausible and plausible anchoring effects in terms of the same, simple priming 
mechanism. An ‘adjustment’ process, therefore, is not postulated in the present 
model, because implausible anchoring effects can be explained by an increase in 
accessibility of anchor-related words, after considering an implausible vs. plausible 
anchor value. 
Correction processes 
Consistent with the social cognitive literature on priming, or knowledge 
activation in general, is the notion that anchor-based semantics may sometimes be 
perceived as irrelevant for a subsequent judgment (e.g., Higgins, 1996). Specifically, 
under certain circumstances (e.g., same question, but different targets of the absolute 
and comparative judgment), judges may perceive the general semantic notions, 
activated during the comparative judgment, to be irrelevant for a subsequent absolute 
judgment. Study 4 conducted as part of this dissertation failed to support this notion, 
in a condition in which participants were first anchored on their own geographical 
knowledge before being asked to estimate another person’s level of geographical 




judgment tasks should have been perceived as illegitimate, in terms of using the self-
knowledge prime, participants nonetheless anchored the other target’s geographical 
knowledge on semantic notions that were activated during a self-comparison task.  
This finding constitutes an inconsistency to the findings obtained by Strack 
and Mussweiler’s (2000a) and to their conceptualization of the anchoring effect. 
Specifically, these authors assume that knowledge, activated via a positive hypothesis 
test, will not influence absolute judgments, unless judges perceived the knowledge to 
be relevant (i.e., applicable and representative) to a subsequent judgment. Because, 
according to the SA model, anchoring effects are mediated by target-specific 
knowledge, the anchoring effect was described to be limited to the traditional 
paradigm, in which the target of the comparative question is identical to the target of 
the absolute question (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000b). The present theory differs from 
the SA model in this regard, because the knowledge activated in response to 
processing a comparative question is hypothesized to be sufficiently general in nature 
to allow for cross-target effects as well. That is, although the activation of anchor-
based semantics is hypothesized to depend on the categorization of the target and the 
anchor value at the time of the comparative judgment, once general semantic notions 
are activated, they hold the potential to influence a number of subsequent judgments. 
These types of cross-target effects, however, may be dependent on the nature of the 
absolute estimation task. Specifically, the differences in results between study 4 in 
this series and Mussweiler and Strack’s (2000a) third study suggest that quick 
numerical estimates appear to be unaffected by meta-cognitive considerations that 




may still inhibit objectively irrelevant knowledge on more effortful tasks (such as a 
free response description related to the judgmental dimension) as was demonstrated 
by Mussweiler and Strack (2000a). Whether or not there truly are replicable 
differences in meta-cognitive correction processes, as a function of the type of 
estimation task involved (e.g., short vs. lengthy) could be fruitfully examined in 
future research. 
Relation to basic anchoring 
One of the goals of the present research was to empirically distinguish the 
presently proposed theory of anchoring from the basic anchoring notions put forth by 
Wilson et al. (1996), who argued that judges may exhibit anchoring in ‘changed 
target’ paradigms, due to the influence of a short-term memory representation of the 
anchor value. While Strack and Mussweiler’s (1997) model does not account for 
(assimilative) anchoring effects when the target of the judgment changes between the 
comparative and absolute judgment task, both Wilson et al.’s (1996) numeric priming 
as well as the present anchor-based semantic priming theory predict cross-target 
effects, based on the explication of more general, mediating psychological 
mechanisms. For example, in one study described by Wilson et al. (1996), in which 
participants low in geographic knowledge compared the number of countries in the 
United Nations to an anchor value (1930) or the number of physicians in the 
phonebook to that same anchor value, showed anchoring effects with comparable 
effect sizes (compared to a no anchor control condition), when all participants 
estimated the number of UN nations. While Wilson et al. (1996) argued that 




would argue that the number (e.g., 1930) used in both comparison tasks (UN nations 
and physicians) activated the notions “a lot”, or “much” (relative to the control 
condition in their study). These semantic notions later influenced the absolute 
question involving the number of countries in the UN.   
A number of studies in this dissertation appear to favor the latter explanation 
over Wilson et al.’s (1996) model of anchoring. For example, general concepts 
related to the dimension of length influenced estimations of the length of a whale, in 
study 2. Since this study did not include any numerical anchor values, Wilson et al.’ 
model cannot account for this effect. Similarly, in studies 5 and 6, in which the 
numerical value of the anchor was held constant between subjects, significant 
anchoring effects were obtained by varying the target of the judgment, thereby 
imbuing the anchor values with different meanings. Again, Wilson et al.’s numeric 
priming model is unable to account for this effect, because the numerical anchors 
were held constant. 
It should be noted here that some studies in the Wilson et al. (1996) series 
included a paradigm, in which participants did not make any explicit comparisons 
with the anchor value, but merely were engaged in a task that increased the 
accessibility of differentially valued numbers in short-term memory. For example, 
participants in one study were asked to copy a series of numbers under the guise of a 
‘graphology’ experiment, thereby increasing the accessibility of those numbers. As 
Wilson et al. (1996) showed, anchoring effects were obtained on a subsequent 
estimation task as a function of the value of the numbers used in the graphology 




failed (Brewer & Chapman, 2002). Because these types of no-comparison numeric 
effects are difficult to replicate, using a set of numbers that differs from those used by 
Wilson et al. (1996), Brewer and Chapman concluded that the basic anchoring effect 
in its purest form (not involving comparisons) is rather fragile. Thus, while reliable 
anchoring effects are likely to be obtained by priming semantic associates of the 
anchor values (without explicit comparisons, see studies 2, 5 and 6), a similar 
procedure involving merely numerical values appears to be difficult to replicate. 
From the point of view of the present theory, this replication failure of pure numeric 
effects does not seem surprising, because numerical values by themselves do not 
appear to be meaningful without proper contextualization, and thus, appear less 
relevant to a judgment than an anchor-related semantic concept (see Pierro, Mannetti, 
Kruglanski, & Sleeth-Keppler, 2004). On the other hand, once numerical values are 
contextualized, they may prime powerful semantic associates, that subsequently 
influence a variety of judgments.  
Finally, the present work introduced an associative knowledge activation 
process that is able to account for contrast effects as well as assimilation effects in 
anchoring. Thus, in addition to contrast effects that are obtained as a function of 
meta-cognitive correction processes, judgmental contrasting away from the anchor 
value may be fruitfully predicted in terms of a rule-based mechanism, in which judges 
associatively activate relevant semantic concepts, after considering a given anchor 
value. In these terms, study 3 in this series showed that priming an associative rule 
before having judges compare the average price of a watch to a high or low anchor 




weight estimate, relative to the anchor value, depended on the nature of the rule that 
was primed before the anchoring task. 
Interestingly, the process of anchor-based (associative) semantic activation 
provides a framework for the explanation of a number of studies that show a 
‘spreading’ influence of anchor values onto a variety of judgments. For example, in a 
study by Chapman and Bornstein (1996), which examined the effects of anchoring 
and adjustment in a legal setting (using mock jurors), found that anchoring 
participants on a high or low compensations amount for a given personal injury claim 
not only affected the final compensation amount awarded by the jurors but also 
affected estimates of the probability that the defendant actually caused the plaintiff 
harm. This finding could be interpreted as reflecting the operation of a rule-based 
mechanism. Thus, participants in this study may have adhered to a subjective rule that 
‘if a high compensation amount, then the crime is severe’ (relative to a low 
compensation amount). The high probability estimate that the defendant caused the 
plaintiff harm may have been due the activation of the concept ‘severe crime’, in 
response to receiving a high compensation request from the trial lawyer. 
Future research directions 
The presently proposed anchoring mechanism yields the potential for a 
number of future research endeavors. For example, while the present set of studies 
provides evidence for the influence of anchor-related words on anchoring, the 
specificity of the influence of these words on subsequent judgments could be 
investigated further. For example, it is unclear, on the basis of these studies, whether 




(e.g., ‘old’, ‘expensive’, ‘long’, ‘wide’) or more dimension independent semantic 
concepts such as (‘a lot’, ‘a little’, ‘much’, ‘few’, etc.). Thus, in the latter case, 
anchors, considered across a variety of judgmental dimensions, could be represented 
in terms of general semantic notions such as ‘a lot’, or ‘a little’. If that were the case, 
one could present participants with a virtually unlimited range of targets, unrelated to 
the comparative question, and an anchoring effect would occur. If, however, the 
semantic notions are specifically tied to the judgmental dimensions under 
consideration during the comparative judgment task, a subsequent target estimated 
should only be affected by the anchor value if the estimation is along a similar 
judgmental dimension, to that considered during the comparative task. These and 
many other questions, for example, involving the degree to which considerations of 







Personal Knowledge Questionnaire 
Gender: ______________ 
 
Please complete the questions below.  Notice that the response scale varies between 
Light vs. Heavy and Expensive vs. Inexpensive. With regard to each question, you 
may use the most appropriate scale to circle your answer (either Light/Heavy or 
Expensive/Inexpensive). 
 
1. What is the weight of a feather? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
 
2. What is the price of a 2-karat diamond? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
3. What is the weight of a swordfish?  
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
4. What is the price of a gallon of gasoline? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
5. What is the price of a meal at McDonalds? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
6. What is the weight of a humming bird? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
7. What is the weight of a penny? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 





8. What is the price of a loaf of bread? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
9. What is the price of a ticket to a Broadway show? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
10. What is the price of a vacation in Hawaii? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
11. What is the weight of an airplane? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
12. What is the weight of a pen? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
13. What is the price of university textbooks? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
14. What is the weight of an orange? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
15. What is the weight of a black bear? 
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
Light              Heavy 
16. What is the average price of cellular phone?  
Inexpensive            Expensive 
1                  2                  3                   4                  5                  6                  7 
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